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Abstract
This Article takes a comprehensive look at the failure of Title VII as a system
for claiming nondiscrimination rights. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007), requir-
ing an employee to assert a Title VII pay discrimination claim within 180 days of
when the discriminatory pay decision was first made, marks the tip of the iceberg
in this flawed system.
In the past decade, Title VII doctrines at both ends of the rights-claiming pro-
cess have become increasing hostile to employees. At the front end, Title VII
imposes strict requirements on employees to promptly report and assert claims of
discrimination. These requirements leave little room for gaps in knowledge, hesi-
tation in responding, or fears of retaliation to delay rights-claiming.
The model of rights-claiming behavior at the heart of this doctrine contrasts starkly
with extensive social science research on how people perceive and respond to dis-
crimination in the real world. The juxtaposition of Title VII doctrine with this
social science literature reveals a fundamentally flawed framework for asserting
discrimination rights. Employees make out poorly at the other end of the rights-
claiming process too. Those employees who do step forward to complain of dis-
crimination are left with grossly inadequate protection from retaliation for doing
so.
Recent developments in retaliation law have weakened protections for employ-
ees, reinforcing the very reasons employees are unlikely to assert nondiscrimi-
nation rights in the first place. Together, Title VII’s timely complaint and re-
taliation doctrines create an untenable framework for employees in need of the
law’s substantive protections. Rather than salvage this system, the recent trend
toward employer-sponsored internal processes for resolving discrimination com-
plaints exacerbates these flaws in ways that have yet to be acknowledged in the
push for greater reliance on such internal processes.
This Article marks an important contribution to the literature on Title VII and
discrimination law, as the first major examination of how Title VII functions as a
rights-claiming system.
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ABSTRACT 
This Article takes a comprehensive look at the failure of Title VII as a system for 
claiming nondiscrimination rights.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ledbetter v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007), requiring an employee to 
assert a Title VII pay discrimination claim within 180 days of when the discriminatory pay 
decision was first made, marks the tip of the iceberg in this flawed system.  In the past 
decade, Title VII doctrines at both ends of the rights-claiming process have become 
increasing hostile to employees.  At the front end, Title VII imposes strict requirements on 
employees to promptly report and assert claims of discrimination.  These requirements 
leave little room for gaps in knowledge, hesitation in responding, or fears of retaliation to 
delay rights-claiming.  The model of rights-claiming behavior at the heart of this doctrine 
contrasts starkly with extensive social science research on how people perceive and 
respond to discrimination in the real world.  The juxtaposition of Title VII doctrine with 
this social science literature reveals a fundamentally flawed framework for asserting 
discrimination rights.   Employees make out poorly at the other end of the rights-claiming 
process too.  Those employees who do step forward to complain of discrimination are left 
with grossly inadequate protection from retaliation for doing so.  Recent developments in 
retaliation law have weakened protections for employees, reinforcing the very reasons 
employees are unlikely to assert nondiscrimination rights in the first place.  Together, Title 
VII’s timely complaint and retaliation doctrines create an untenable framework for 
employees in need of the law’s substantive protections.  Rather than salvage this system, 
the recent trend toward employer-sponsored internal processes for resolving discrimination 
complaints exacerbates these flaws in ways that have yet to be acknowledged in the push 
for greater reliance on such internal processes.  This Article marks an important 
contribution to the literature on Title VII and discrimination law, as the first major 
examination of how Title VII functions as a rights-claiming system. 
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3INTRODUCTION 
In a recent controversial ruling, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,1 a
divided Supreme Court severely undercut the ability of pay discrimination claimants to 
enforce their rights under Title VII, the main federal anti-employment-discrimination 
statute.2 In its decision, the Court applied the statute of limitations in a way that ignored 
the realities of both pay discrimination claims specifically and workplace bias claims 
more generally.  While devastating for pay discrimination claimants in particular, 
Ledbetter is only the tip of the iceberg.  As a result of many intersecting doctrines, and 
the realities of how employees experience and respond to discrimination, Title VII has 
become a failure as a rights-claiming system. 
 This paper explores the conflicts for employees created by the gap between Title 
VII’s regime for invoking its protections and the workplace realities of perceiving and 
claiming discrimination.  Most discrimination scholarship focuses on the substantive 
reach of discrimination law.  Over the years, that body of work has developed a rich 
critique of the shortcomings of law’s conception of discrimination and the deeper, more 
subtle forms of bias that it fails to reach, including a well-documented critique of the gap 
between law’s aspirations and the realities of workplace bias.  Our focus here is different:  
we scrutinize Title VII’s regime for claiming anti-discrimination rights—a purportedly 
neutral set of procedures that govern access to the law’s substantive protections—and 
conclude that it comes up short. 
 The effectiveness of Title VII depends on the law’s success in providing 
employees with access to the law’s substantive protections and protecting them from 
retaliation when they seek to invoke these protections.  Title VII’s enforcement 
framework depends on employees’ willingness to step forward and act, in effect, as 
“private attorneys general” to enforce the law.3 As the Second Circuit recently observed, 
“Title VII combats unlawful employment practices…principally through reliance on 
employee initiative.”4 Yet, at many different junctures, employees are stymied and 
deterred in their efforts to take this initiative. 
 An examination of Title VII’s rights-claiming regime reveals a deeply flawed 
system.  A successful rights-claiming system must respond to employees’ needs at both 
ends of the rights-claiming process, enabling and encouraging employees whose rights 
are violated to come forward and protecting them from possible retaliation when they do.  
The soundness of a rights-claiming system is best evaluated holistically because the 
 
1 127 S. Ct. 2162, 167 L. Ed. 2d 982 (2007).  Soon after Ledbetter was decided, a bill to undo the 
ruling was introduced in Congress.  See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, H.R. 2831 (introduced 
June 22, 2007).  The bill was passed by the House of Representatives, see 110 Bill Tracking H.R. 2831, and 
is currently pending in the Senate.  President Bush, however, issued a formal statement of opposition to the 
Act.  See Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy:  H.R. 2831—Lilly 
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007 (July 27, 2007). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000). 
3 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975). 
4 Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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4dynamics of rights-claiming at both ends of the process are interactive.  The failure to 
adequately encourage and enable rights-claiming contributes to an environment where 
rights-claiming is aberrational, increasing the likelihood that employees who do complain 
will be viewed as trouble-makers and provoke retaliation.  Perhaps even more 
significantly, inadequate protection from retaliation reinforces the obstacles that suppress 
rights-claiming in the first place.  Title VII fails employees at both ends of this process. 
 Title VII’s requirements for reporting and challenging discrimination reveal a 
view of “employee initiative”—how employees perceive and respond to discrimination—
that is contrary to the way these processes actually take place.  The law’s timely filing 
and reporting doctrines take as its worthy claimant a person who quickly and accurately 
perceives discrimination and responds by promptly challenging it, undeterred by the 
social costs of complaining or the prospect of retaliation.  Most employees do not 
measure up to these expectations and thus find themselves unable to invoke the law’s 
substantive protections.  Thus, in its current form, Title VII’s rights-claiming regime fails 
to encourage or enable typical employees to secure the law’s substantive protection 
against workplace discrimination. 
 The law fails employees at the other end of the rights-claiming process as well.  
Employees who overcome these obstacles and manage to assert their rights are left 
without adequate protection from retaliation for doing so.  Contrary to judicial rhetoric 
promising generous protection from retaliation, Title VII leaves employees unprotected 
from significant retaliatory harms, adding to the very vulnerabilities that make employees 
circumspect about challenging discrimination in the first place.  Together, the increasing 
strictness of Title VII’s timely filing and reporting doctrines and the increasing dilution 
of the law’s protection from retaliation combine to create a double-bind for employees 
who experience discrimination.  The result is a rights-claiming system that it is extremely 
difficult for employees to safely navigate. 
 The increasing privatization of employment disputes—a recent trend noted by 
many scholars—adds to the severity and nature of the problems we identify.  By 
channeling bias claims into internal dispute resolution processes, in lieu of or as a 
prerequisite to the pursuit of formal statutory remedies, employers have effectively added 
another layer of obstacles to the enforcement of employees’ statutory rights.  Although 
employers increasingly direct or require employees to exhaust internal grievance 
procedures before filing lawsuits, Title VII’s timely filing requirements are not tolled in 
the interim.  The clock may run out on an employee who delays filing formal charges in 
the hopes of resolving the dispute internally.  Internal dispute resolution processes also 
further jeopardize employee protections against retaliation, which are watered down for 
participation in extra-statutory processes, even if the employee had little choice in 
whether to pursue such processes. 
 Part I of this Article chronicles the various doctrines that obligate employees to 
promptly challenge and report violations of Title VII rights.  These doctrines include the 
statute of limitations, the definition of the acts that trigger the limitations period, the 
inadequacy of equitable tolling and discovery rules, the special rules for reporting and 
challenging sexual harassment, and the role of internal employer procedures in the timing 
requirements for formally asserting Title VII rights.  Each of these doctrines presupposes 
an ideal claimant who is fully aware of her rights, quickly perceives discrimination, and 
does not falter or hesitate in challenging discrimination through the prescribed channels.  
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5Together, these doctrines function to close off substantive protections from employees 
who do not match the law’s ideal. 
 Part II turns to the extensive social science literature on how people actually 
perceive and respond to discrimination to contrast the law’s ideal claimant with the 
realities of workers’ lives.  This section parses two distinct bodies of literature:  research 
on the processes of perceiving discrimination and the study of how people respond when 
they do perceive discrimination.  Contrary to the law’s implicit assumption that 
employees immediately know when they have experienced discrimination, knowledge of 
discrimination is obscured and suppressed by several psychological processes.  As a 
result, most social psychologists believe that under-perception of discrimination, rather 
than hyper-vigilance, is the norm.  The law also falls wide of the mark in its assumptions 
about how people respond to discrimination.  Far from the assertive complainant the law 
requires, people rarely respond to perceived discrimination with prompt complaints and 
challenges.  Indeed, the reality of how people respond contrasts sharply not only with 
how judges envision employees will act, but also with how employees themselves expect 
they would respond to discrimination.  People share a widespread belief that, if 
confronted with discrimination, they would immediately challenge it.  In fact, when faced 
with such circumstances, they do the opposite.  This gap between expectation and reality 
is deeply embedded in Title VII doctrine, with devastating consequences. 
 Finally, Part III examines Title VII’s effectiveness at the end of the rights-
claiming process, analyzing major gaps in the law’s protection from retaliation.  This 
section examines recent developments in two major doctrines, the materially adverse 
standard and the reasonable belief requirement, that together leave gaping holes in the 
law’s protection from retaliation.  Although the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in 
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company v. White5 purported to expand 
retaliation protections to prohibit employer actions that “well might have ‘disuaded a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination,” lower court 
interpretations to date have taken a cramped and narrow approach to this standard.  As a 
result, many employer actions that are likely to deter actual employees from complaining 
are left undisturbed and unregulated, reinforcing the very concerns that deter 
discrimination complaints in the first place.  Perhaps even more critical, another doctrine, 
the requirement that an employee have a reasonable belief that the challenged conduct is 
unlawful before complaining of discrimination, creates enormous risks for employees 
considering whether to challenge perceived discrimination.  Recent lower court decisions 
have made this under-examined doctrine one of the biggest threats to rights-claiming 
under the statute.  This section brings our look at Title VII’s rights-claiming process full 
circle, demonstrating the predicament created by a structure that imposes a rigid set of 
requirements for quickly asserting nondiscrimination rights, but provides insufficient 
protection from retaliation for doing so. 
 Ultimately, we conclude that even apart from critiques of the law’s substantive 
reach in defining discrimination, Title VII is fundamentally flawed as a rights-claiming 
system. 
 
5 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). 
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6I. TITLE VII’S PROMPT COMPLAINT DOCTRINES 
At many different junctures, Title VII law makes assumptions about 
discrimination victims:  what they know, when they know it, and how they respond to the 
information they are assumed to have.  The law then takes these assumptions and 
translates them into requirements:  employees must quickly perceive and promptly report 
discrimination in order to invoke the substantive protection of anti-discrimination law. 
 Numerous doctrines place pressures on employees to quickly recognize and 
challenge discrimination when they experience it.  They include the short statute of 
limitations, strict rules defining the acts that trigger it, inadequate tolling and discovery 
rules, a special set of requirements for reporting harassment, and an all-but mandatory 
extra layer of internal dispute resolution that does not extend the time for formally 
asserting rights.  As a whole, this body of doctrine leaves little room for uncertainty or 
hesitation, and requires a high degree of employee awareness and vigilance in the 
assertion of Title VII rights. 
A. THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD 
At the root of the problem for rights-claiming under Title VII is the statute’s 
unusually short statute of limitations.  Under current law, a victim of employment 
discrimination must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
within “one hundred and eighty days after the unlawful employment practice occurred” 
or within three hundred days if the claim goes directly to a state work-sharing agency.6
As enacted in 1964, the original statute had a charge-filing period of only 90 days.7
Subsequent amendments in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 extended 
this period to the current limit, over opponents’ charges that the extension would lead to 
“stale charges” and “indefinite liabilities.”8 The 180/300 day limitations period was 
patterned after the National Labor Relations Act, a poor model, given the significant 
differences in the ease of identifying unlawful practices under each statute.9
Congress did not revisit the limitations period until 1990.  The Civil Rights Act of 
1990, a bill that passed Congress but was vetoed by the first President Bush, was 
designed to override a number of Supreme Court rulings that had narrowed the scope of 
Title VII’s substantive protections against discrimination.10 It also, however, included a 
provision extending the limitations period to two years,11 in order to more closely match 
other federal laws, including federal anti-discrimination laws that give employees a 
 
6 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).  The majority of states operate under the 300 day limitations period 
because of state work-sharing agreements. 
7 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(d), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (1964). 
8 H.R. REP. NO. 90-238, at 65-66; see also Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub L. 
No. 92-261, § 4(a), § 706(e), 86 Stat. 103, 105 (1972). 
9 H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 65 (1971) (minority views on H.R. 1746). 
10 See S. 2104 (101st Cong. 2d Sess.). 
11 See S. 2104 § 7. 
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7longer period in which to make claims.12 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a much older 
federal law prohibiting race discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, 
borrows the limitations period from analogous state law claims in the state in which the 
suit is brought.13 Claims for asserting personal rights, such as tort claims, typically allow 
a 2-3 year limitations period.14 
The effort to expand Title VII’s statute of limitations period in the proposed Civil 
Rights Act of 1990 was highly contested, with opponents raising familiar concerns about 
“stale claims,” expanding employer liability, and displacing Title VII’s ostensible goal of 
conciliation with a more tort-like adversarial model.15 Supporters of the extension 
countered that the statute’s unusually short limitations period failed to account for the 
“substantial time” it takes for an individual to realize discrimination has occurred, learn 
about the available remedies, and obtain the assistance of counsel.16 
After the 1990 bill was vetoed, its successor, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, was 
almost immediately introduced in the House.17 The bill again included a two-year 
limitations period, intended to bring Title VII into alignment with a variety of federal 
civil rights laws with longer limitations periods.18 As it had been in 1990, however, this 
provision was contested, and the proposed extension was not included in the Senate bill 
that was ultimately enacted into law.19 
The failure of congressional efforts to expand the limitations period in the 1991 
Act closed the door on further reform efforts.  Title VII’s limitations period remains 
unusually short when compared to the vast majority of other laws seeking to vindicate 
personal rights, and Congress has not made any meaningful effort to expand it in the 
intervening eighteen years. 
 
12 See, e.g., Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006) (providing a two-year statute 
of limitations); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255 (2006) (providing a two-year limitations period, 
extended to three years for willful violations); Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 255 (2006) (providing a two-
year statute of limitations, extended to three for willful violations). 
13See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987) (holding that Section 1981 claims, 
for which there is no express statute of limitations, should be governed by an analogous period under state 
law).  The most analogous limitations period is the one that governs residual or general personal injury 
rather than torts.  See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). 
14 See, e.g., Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying 
Connecticut’s three-year personal injury statute of limitations to § 1981 claim); see also Joanna L. 
Grossman, Making a Federal Case Out of It:  Section 1981 and At-Will Employment, 67 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 329 (2001) (“In many states, . . . the statute of limitations under § 1981 is considerably longer than 
that under Title VII.”). 
15 S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 62-63 (1990) (minority views of Sens. Hatch, Thurmond, and Coats on 
S. 2104); H.R. REP. NO. 101-644(I), at 79-80 (1990) (minority views on H.R. 4000). 
16 H.R. REP. NO. 101-644(I), at 25-26, 45-46 (1990). 
17 H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (introduced Jan. 3, 1991). 
18 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 63-64 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 601-02. 
19 See S. 1745, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see, e.g., 137 
CONG. REC. H3857-01, H3873 (1991) (warning that “[p]assage of this legislation will mean an unending 
supply of discrimination cases for trial lawyers throughout the country”). 
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8B. TRIGGERING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: THE DISCRETE ACT RULE 
Title VII’s short statute of limitations is exacerbated by doctrines with strict rules 
about how to define the “unlawful employment practice” that triggers the limitations 
period.  In 2002, the Supreme Court decided National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
in which it rejected the “continuing violations” doctrine.20 Abner Morgan, a black 
electrician, sued his employer, alleging a series of discriminatory acts—that he was paid 
differently, punished unfairly, denied union representation in disciplinary meetings, and 
harassed because of his race—between when he was hired in 1990 and fired in 1995.  
Amtrak won summary judgment on some claims because they occurred more than 300 
days before Morgan filed a complaint with the EEOC and were therefore time-barred. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that under the continuing violations doctrine, which 
permits a pattern of discrimination to form the basis for a lawsuit as long as at least one 
act occurred within the limitations period, the time-barred claims were “sufficiently 
related” to the timely ones.21 The continuing violations doctrine, which was widely 
accepted by lower courts at the time, reflected the recognition that discrimination 
develops and burdens its victim over time and that it is often difficult to discern until an 
extended pattern emerges. 
 The Supreme Court in Morgan rejected the continuing violations doctrine and 
instead ruled that for discrimination that occurs in “discrete” acts, such as hiring, firing, 
promotion, demotion and transfer decisions, the limitations period begins anew with the 
occurrence of each act of discrimination.22 For such discrete acts of discrimination, and 
excepting hostile environment harassment which the Court treated specially,23 employees 
must challenge each discrete act within 180/300 days.24 Prior acts of discrimination are 
relevant only as background evidence and are not themselves actionable.25 
Morgan’s list of discrete discriminatory acts did not include pay discrimination, 
and federal appellate court rulings after Morgan almost universally continued to apply the 
rule enunciated in Bazemore v. Friday26 that each discriminatory paycheck issued within 
 
20 536 U.S. 101 (2002). 
21 Morgan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir.), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002). 
22 Because hostile environment harassment by its very nature involves multiple incidents that 
occur over time.  Morgan, 536 U.S. at 104.  Some courts have held that discrete acts are still subject to the 
rule in Morgan even if they are mixed in with allegations of a hostile environment.  See, e.g., Sasse v. U.S. 
Dept. of Labor, 409 F.3d 773 (6th Cir. 2005); Pruitt v. City of Chicago, 472 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 2006). 
23 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.  The special rules for challenging hostile environment harassment are 
discussed infra, text at notes 48-76. 
24 Id. at 122. 
25 See, e.g., Ramirez Rodriguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 425 F.3d 67 
(2005) (permitting an ADEA plaintiff  to introduce prior acts as background evidence). 
26 478 U.S. 385, 395 (Brennan, J., joined by all other Members of the Court, concurring in part) 
(“each week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable 
under Title VII”).  For federal appellate decisions continuing to rely on Bazemore after Morgan, see, for 
example, Forsyth v. Federal Employment and Guidance Serv., 409 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 2005); Shea v. 
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9the limitations period is actionable even if the pay discrimination first began long ago.  In 
2007, in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,27 however, the Supreme Court 
departed from this consensus and extended Morgan’s discrete-act rule to pay 
discrimination claims.  In an opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito, the Ledbetter 
majority held that an employee must challenge pay discrimination within 180/300 days of 
the decision to pay her a discriminatory wage, rejecting the longstanding position of the 
EEOC, the agency charged with enforcing Title VII, that pay discrimination could be 
challenged within 180/300 days of any paycheck containing a discriminatory wage.28 
The majority reasoned that a paycheck containing a discriminatory amount of money is 
not a present violation, but merely the present effect of a prior act of discrimination.  
“[C]urrent effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, charged discrimination,” the Court 
wrote, and “such effects in themselves have no present legal consequences.”29 
Both Morgan and Ledbetter add to a body of law that erects substantial 
roadblocks for plaintiffs attempting to claim anti-discrimination rights.  Both decisions 
exacerbate time pressures under prior rulings defining the acts that the trigger the 
limitations period to occur at the earliest possible moment.  In a series of decisions, the 
Supreme Court established that the limitations period begins to run when the decision to 
discriminate has been made and communicated, even if the decision is implemented or its 
effects are felt at a later date.30 A discriminatory decision denying tenure, for example, 
 
Rice, 409 F.3d 448, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  See also Inglis v. Buena Vista Univ., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 
1020-22 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (describing the pre-Morgan consensus applying the continuing violations 
doctrine applied to pay claims). 
27 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007). 
28 Id. at 2177 n.11 (refusing to extend Chevron deference to the EEOC’s Compliance Manual or its 
adjudicatory decisions). 
29 Id. at 2169. 
30 See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 557 (1977) (ruling that airline’s failure 
to credit employee with seniority when she was rehired following her prior dismissal under a 
discriminatory policy was merely a “present effect to [its] past illegal act” for limitations purposes); 
Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (running statute of limitations from the initial 
decision to deny tenure rather than from the expiration of the plaintiff’s teaching contract or the employer’s 
refusal to change the decision in its review processes); Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) 
(finding plaintiffs timebarred from challenging the discriminatory adoption of a facially neutral seniority 
system where the decision to adopt the system was made outside the limitations period, even though the 
system was first applied to plaintiffs, causing their demotion, within the limitations period).  Congress 
overturned the Lorance decision with respect to seniority systems in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000) (defining an “unlawful employment practice” to occur “when the seniority 
system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved 
is injured by the application of the seniority system”).  Although the legislative history of the 1991 Act 
strongly suggests that the intent behind this provision was much broader, the Ledbetter majority limited the 
Act to seniority systems, citing Lorance as good law for the principle that discriminatory decisions, not 
their effects, trigger Title VII’s statute of limitations.  Compare 137 CONG. REC. S15483, 15485 (daily ed. 
Oct. 30, 1991) (interpretive memo of Sen. Danforth) (“This legislation should be interpreted as 
disapproving the extension of this decision rule [in Lorance] to contexts outside of seniority systems”), 
with Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. 2162 (relying in part on Lorance to bar pay discrimination claim where 
discriminatory decision occurred outside the limitations period and limiting the 1991 provision to seniority 
systems). 
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triggers the statute of limitations, even if the employee continues teaching and does not 
feel the effect of that decision until he is terminated much later.31 By rejecting the 
continuing violations doctrine for discrete acts of discrimination and defining discrete 
acts to include all individual disparate treatment cases except hostile environment 
harassment, the Morgan and Ledbetter decisions add to this time pressure.  Together, this 
body of doctrine sets the critical point in time as the original discriminatory decision, 
rather than the timing of the discriminatory effects or the accumulation of discriminatory 
harm.  Yet, an employee may be unable to recognize discrimination, and insufficiently 
motivated to act to challenge it, until the effects of discrimination are felt and accumulate. 
 Most importantly, neither Morgan nor Ledbetter accounts for the fact that an 
employee may not realize that she has experienced discrimination in time to protect her 
rights under these rulings.  For example, if a female employee is denied a raise that her 
male colleagues receive, she may not realize that a discrete adverse act has occurred at 
all.  Even if she is aware of an adverse employment decision, she may not realize that it is 
attributable to discrimination.  And even if she recognizes that a discrete act occurred and 
was discriminatory, she may decide not to complain unless it gets worse, for fear of 
adverse consequences.  Yet the Court’s doctrine assumes that employees possess 
immediate and certain knowledge of the moment in time at which discrimination occurs. 
 The realities of perceiving and reporting discrimination depart dramatically from 
this idealized vision, however, so that the discrete act rule has the effect of validating and 
perpetuating longstanding discrimination.  Under the Ledbetter ruling, for example, a 
woman could be paid a discriminatory wage for her entire career as long as the initial 
discriminatory decision went unchallenged for 180/300 days.  As Justice Ginsburg 
lamented in her Ledbetter dissent, “[a]ny annual pay decision not contested immediately . 
. . becomes grandfathered, a fait accompli beyond the province of Title VII ever to 
repair.”32 The Court’s strict timely filing rules are thus skewed to protect employers 
rather than to facilitate employees asserting their rights. 
C. THE INADEQUACY OF TOLLING DOCTRINES AND DISCOVERY RULES 
Together, Morgan and Ledbetter apply Title VII’s short statute of limitations 
period strictly for most discrimination claimants, a hardship that might be lessened in 
some cases by application of a robust tolling doctrine and discovery rule.  The Supreme 
Court, however, has been circumspect about, and lower courts have divided over, the 
applicability of such doctrines to the extent that they benefit plaintiffs. 
 Because the limitations period under Title VII is not a jurisdictional prerequisite 
to suit in federal court, courts have the power to extend or shorten it based on equitable 
considerations.33 Both employers and employees are theoretically protected by such 
 
31 Ricks, 449 U.S. 250; see also Ruiz-Sulsona v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 334 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 
2003) (applying same rule post-Morgan); Cooper v. St. Cloud State Univ., 226 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(the initial denial of tenure triggered the limitations period, not the plaintiff’s termination four years later). 
32 127 U.S. at 2178. 
33 See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (noting the power of courts to 
apply doctrines such as waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling to Title VII’s timely filing requirements). 
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equitable considerations.  For employers, the doctrine of laches has been applied to place 
a limit on the filing of claims to shorten an existing limitations period, or to preclude 
undue delay in filing a suit after the EEOC has evaluated the charge.34 This doctrine 
protects the employer from any unfair prejudice caused by a plaintiff’s (or the EEOC’s) 
sitting on her rights.35 
Statutory limitations periods can also be extended for the benefit of employees by 
the doctrine of equitable tolling or the application of a discovery rule, which delay the 
start of the limitations period to account for wrongdoing by the employer or gaps in the 
employee’s knowledge that would keep a reasonable employee from filing a claim.  The 
Supreme Court has said that equitable tolling principles apply under Title VII, although it 
has cautioned that they should be “applied sparingly.”36 This admonition is itself telling, 
revealing a presumption that imperfect knowledge of discrimination and justified delay in 
filing a charge are aberrational and not the norm.  Taking this to heed, lower courts have 
applied equitable tolling in a way that is too limited to affect most cases.  Even some 
kinds of clear wrongdoing by employers for the purpose of forestalling Title VII claims 
do not toll the limitations period, such that a direct threat of retaliation has been ruled not 
to toll the limitations period.37 And with respect to the difficulties employees face in 
discerning discrimination, equitable tolling does very little to ease these problems.  
Courts generally refuse to toll the limitations period based on the employee’s lack of 
information unless the employer actively concealed relevant facts or actively misled the 
employee into believing she did not have a claim.38 
Active concealment by employers, however, accounts for little of the problem in 
perceiving discrimination,39 and plaintiffs who lack knowledge of discrimination for 
other reasons are unprotected by the equitable tolling doctrine.  To deal with the more 
common situation, employees who have insufficient knowledge to recognize when they 
have experienced discrimination, a more specific equitable rule—a discovery rule—is 
 
34 See, e.g., Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121 (“an employer may raise a laches defense, which bars a 
plaintiff from maintaining a suit if he unreasonably delays in filing a suit and as a result harms the 
defendant”).  The defense of laches is available upon proof of “(1) lack of diligence by the party against 
whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.”  Id. at 122. 
35 See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977) (applying laches to protect an 
employer who “might still be significantly handicapped in making his defense because of an inordinate 
EEOC delay in filing the action after exhausting its conciliation efforts”); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975) (applying laches based on delay of an individual party in pursuing her claim).  
For a more recent case applying laches to bar the plaintiff’s claim, even though the statute of limitations 
had not yet run, see Smith v. Caterpillar, Inc., 338 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2003). 
36 Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2003). 
37 See Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a threat of 
retaliation as a basis for tolling the limitations period, and stating “[r]ather than deterring a reasonable 
person from suing, it would increase her incentive to sue by giving her a second claim”). 
38 See, e.g., Bishop v. Gainer, 272 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 2001) (refusing to toll the limitations period 
where employer did not actively conceal information or mislead plaintiffs); Bennett v. Quark, Inc., 258 
F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 
1978); Jackson v. Rockford Hous. Auth., 213 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). 
39 See infra text accompanying notes 94-124. 
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necessary.  The Supreme Court, however, has never expressly declared that Title VII 
permits the application of a discovery rule; it expressly declined to consider the question 
in both Morgan and Ledbetter.40 Lower federal courts have split over the existence and 
scope of a discovery rule under Title VII and related federal anti-discrimination laws.  
The Fourth Circuit, for example, refused to apply a discovery rule to toll the statute of 
limitations in Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank,41 a case alleging an unlawful discharge under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  The plaintiff learned only during the 
discovery process that he was paid less than younger employees in the same position.  He 
then filed a pay discrimination claim, seventeen months after he had been discharged.  
The court upheld the dismissal of the pay claim as time-barred because “the 180-day 
period for filing claims begins to run from the time of an alleged discriminatory act” 
regardless of when it was discovered by the plaintiff.42 
Other federal appellate courts have acknowledged the existence of a discovery 
rule in the context of federal anti-discrimination laws, but have construed it so narrowly 
that it rarely applies.  The Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. is 
a good example.43 The plaintiff in that case brought an age discrimination suit against his 
employer when, after telling a manager at the company that he would not be retiring, he 
was told he would be terminated.  The plaintiff did not believe the manager had the 
authority to fire him, but the termination was reaffirmed by his direct supervisor in a 
meeting a few weeks later.  His suit was filed within the limitations period of the meeting 
with his actual supervisor, but not of the conversation with the manager who first 
promised to fire him.44 The Seventh Circuit recognized the existence of a discovery rule, 
but applied it only to the time the “injury” was discovered, the original notice of 
termination, rather than the later reaffirmation or the discovery of evidence suggesting 
“discrimination.”45 For Cada, his injury was discovered when the decision to fire him 
 
40 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2007 LEXIS 6295 n.10 (“We have previously 
declined to address whether Title VII suits are amenable to a discovery rule. Because Ledbetter does not 
argue that such a rule would change the outcome in her case, we have no occasion to address this issue.”) 
(citations omitted); National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 n.7 (“One issue that 
may arise in such circumstances is whether the time begins to run when the injury occurs as opposed to 
when the injury reasonably should have been discovered.  But this case presents no occasion to resolve that 
issue.”). 
41 928 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1990).  See also Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(rejecting applicability of discovery rule to Title VII claims). 
42 928 F.2d at 86. 
43 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990). 
44 Because of a state work-sharing agreement, the applicable limitations period was 300 days in 
this case instead of 180.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 
45 Id. at 450.  Although the Supreme Court has not acknowledged the existence of a discovery rule, 
many courts find support for one in the Supreme Court’s decision in Delaware State College v. Ricks,
which held that the limitations period for an allegedly discriminatory tenure denial began “at the time the 
tenure decision was made and communicated” rather than from the date when the plaintiff’s employment 
contract actually expired.  449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980).  According to the Seventh Circuit, the “discovery rule 
is implicit in the holding of Ricks.”  Cada, 920 F.2d at 450.  Importantly, however, the Court’s phrasing in 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art67
13
was first communicated by the first supervisor, not when it was clear that the termination 
decision was final or when sufficient facts came to light to suggest discrimination. 
 Likewise, in Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman,46 the Third Circuit 
extended the limitations period only to include discovery of the adverse employment 
action, not the discovery of facts suggesting the employer’s discriminatory motive.  In 
that case, a law firm fired a female associate in April 1990 saying that they did not have 
enough work to sustain her position; she learned during an unemployment benefits 
hearing the following year that the firm had hired a male attorney to replace her almost 
immediately.  The court held that the discovery rule delays the statute of limitations only 
until plaintiff “has discovered, or by exercising reasonable diligence, should have 
discovered (1) that he or she has been injured, and (2) that this injury has been caused by 
another party’s conduct.”  In this case, the notice of injury occurred on the day the 
plaintiff was discharged; her later discovery of facts suggesting a discriminatory motive 
was “irrelevant for the purposes of the discovery rule.”47 If courts continue to set the 
critical time for purposes of the discovery as the date the employee learned of the adverse 
action, and not when she learned sufficient facts to suggest discrimination, a more 
widespread adoption of the discovery rule will do very little to ease the burdens facing 
employees under Title VII’s timely filing doctrines. 
 Current judicial application of the discovery rule and equitable tolling rules makes 
plaintiffs’ compliance with Title VII’s short statute of limitations all the more difficult.  
Even a broad discovery rule would not ease the burdens on employees to act quickly to 
challenge perceived discrimination once it is first discovered, rather than waiting until the 
harm accumulates and the employee’s willingness to tolerate the cumulative effects of 
discrimination wanes.  However, the minimalist discovery rules and tolling doctrines 
applied by lower courts to date make the harshness of the Court’s timely filing precedents 
even more palpable for employees who fail to immediately recognize when they 
experience discrimination. 
 
Ricks suggests that it is the communication of the adverse decision, and not the discovery of facts 
suggesting discrimination, that triggers the limitations period. 
46 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994).   
 
47 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Ferrill v. City of Milwaukee, 295 F. Supp. 2d 920, 923 
(E.D. Wis. 2003) (refusing to begin the limitations period for a black former police officer when he learned 
that white officers had received less severe punishments for similar infractions; “when the adverse 
employment action (i.e., the injury) was the termination of employment, the action accrues when the 
plaintiff was advised of the termination, not later when he discovers facts leading him to believe he was the 
victim of discrimination”).  In the pay discrimination context, the discovery rule has been held to toll the 
statute of limitations only until the employee learns that a comparator earns a higher salary, regardless of 
whether she has reason to believe the disparity is based on sex.  See, e.g., Inglis v. Buena Vista Univ., 235 
F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1025-26 (N.D. Iowa 2002); Adams v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 61 Fed. Appx. 285 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (applying discovery rule when black female employee learned from co-workers a year after 
starting employment that white male technicians were being paid more).  However, simply knowing of a 
pay disparity with other workers is not enough to place an employee on notice that the disparity is 
discriminatory.  See, e.g., Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way: 
Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 Berkeley J. Emp. & Labor L. 167, 178 (2004) (“Employees 
observe wage differentials without the full information necessary to evaluate the justifications for differing 
wages.”). 
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D. REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORTING HARASSMENT 
Although Morgan carves out hostile environment claims from its strict rule for 
challenging discrete discriminatory acts,48 even this more lenient treatment is undermined 
by a judicially created affirmative defense to employer liability for hostile environment 
harassment.  In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton49 and Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,50 the 
Supreme Court established an affirmative defense to employer liability for sexual 
harassment by a supervisor that does not inflict tangible harm.  The affirmative defense 
imposes a prompt complaint requirement on harassed employees as a condition of 
preserving the right to enforce Title VII’s substantive guarantees.  Employers may avoid 
liability or damages if they demonstrate both “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the 
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”51 
The prompt filing requirement comes from the second prong, which focuses on 
how the employee responds to the harassment.  Lower courts interpreting the affirmative 
defense have taken a particularly anti-plaintiff view of the second prong for determining 
both whether a delay in filing a complaint was excessive and whether the failure to file a 
complaint was reasonable.52 
According to lower federal courts, a “reasonable” employee who has experienced 
workplace harassment must, at a minimum, file an internal complaint that complies with 
the employer’s policies.  If an employer’s anti-harassment policy has been made 
available to employees,53 courts have found it unreasonable for employees to complain to 
 
48 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115 (“Hostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete acts.  
Their very nature involves repeated conduct.”). 
49 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
50 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
51 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.  Despite the clarity of this test in requiring 
proof of both prongs, some lower courts have effectively waived the second prong where the first prong has 
been established, thereby accepting the affirmative defense to liability based on the reasonableness of the 
employer’s response even where the employee did promptly complain.  See, e.g., McCurdy v. Arkansas 
State Police, 375 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2004); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 
1999); Watkins v. Professional Security Bureau, Ltd., No. 98-2555, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 29841 (4th Cir. 
Nov. 15, 1999).  But see Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 2001) (describing Indest 
as “highly suspect” and refusing to read out the second prong of the affirmative defense).  This 
development illustrates the extent to which lower courts have become hostile to harassment plaintiffs, even 
to the point of ignoring clear Supreme Court language. 
52 For an analysis of the pro-employer way in which the affirmative defense has been applied in 
lower courts, see L. Camille Hebert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual 
Harassment, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 715 (2007) (arguing that “lower courts have applied [Faragher and Ellerth]
in ways quite hostile to the interests of women who have been sexually harassed and quite favorable to the 
interests of employers whose supervisory employees have been accused of sexual harassment”); see also 
Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free:  Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 671, 722-29 (2000) [hereinafter Grossman, The First Bite is Free]. 
53 Cf. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (depriving the employer of the opportunity to prove the 
affirmative defense in part because it “had entirely failed to disseminate its [sexual harassment] policy 
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the wrong person under company policy,54 to go directly to the EEOC or a union 
representative,55 to provide insufficient information for the employer to conduct an 
investigation of the allegations,56 or to fail to cooperate with the investigation.57 
Only prompt complaints are deemed reasonable, and courts tend to take a strict 
view of the term, effectively imposing a phantom deadline even shorter than the statute of 
limitations.  In one extreme case, a week’s delay was too long,58 but even in more typical 
cases, courts expect almost immediate action from harassment victims, especially for 
incidents of severe harassment.  The court in Conatzer v. Medical Professional Building 
Servs., for example, in a section of the opinion entitled “Employee’s Unreasonableness,” 
found it unreasonable as a matter of law for the plaintiff to wait seventeen days from the 
“first significant incident” to complain.59 
Employees who experience harassment and then wait to see if harassing behavior 
continues or to gather more evidence before complaining are often deemed 
unreasonable,60 even though the EEOC’s Compliance Manual states that an “employee 
might reasonably ignore a small number of incidents, hoping that the harassment will 
stop without resort to the complaint process.”61 The strictness of this approach is 
 
among [its] . . . employees”); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance:  The Final 
Triumph of Form Over Substance In Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003) 
(discussing the legal ramifications for employers of failing to disseminate anti-harassment policies) 
[hereinafter Grossman, Culture of Compliance]. 
54 See Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300-02 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that 
complaining to managers not designated by the policy is unreasonable for purposes of the affirmative 
defense); Green v. Wills Group, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 618, 626 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that complaining to 
wrong person rendered victim’s behavior unreasonable). 
55 See, e.g., Jackson v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
electing to file a grievance with the EEOC rather than the employer constitutes an unreasonable failure to 
take advantage of corrective opportunities). 
56 See, e.g., Mernik v. Classic Cars, Inc., NO 3:99-CV-1327-P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9373, at 
**34-35 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2000) (finding plaintiff’s mention to employer of “crude and vulgar” behavior 
was insufficient to constitute availment of the employer’s sexual harassment procedures). 
57 See, e.g., Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that failing to 
give honest answers to employer during investigation is unreasonable); McCluney v. Cuomo, 83 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 893, 899 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding that denying harassment to investigator that 
harassment occurred is unreasonable). 
58 See Marsicano v. Am. Soc’y of Safety Eng’rs, No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 4, 1998) (finding seven-day delay unreasonable). 
59 255 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (N.D. Okla. 2003); see also Walton v. Johnson & Johnson, 347 
F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a three-month delay was unreasonable as a matter of law). 
60 See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
the “gravity and numerosity of the incidents” made it unreasonable for victim to have waited to complain); 
Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (finding failure to report for 3 
months unreasonable even though there was a 3-month gap between the first incident and the next four, 
which happened in rapid succession). 
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particularly notable because employees might not be protected from retaliation if they 
complain too soon, before marshalling sufficient facts and ensuring a sufficient legal 
basis for their complaints.62 
The failure to complain is almost always fatal to the plaintiff’s case, since courts 
have been relatively unwilling to accept excuses and tend, instead, to assume that such a 
failure is always “unreasonable.”63 A “generalized fear of retaliation,” for example, is an 
insufficient justification for not using an employer’s internal grievance procedure (despite 
the frequency with which discrimination victims who complain experience retaliation),64 
and most fears are therefore rejected out of hand.65 In dismissing such fears, courts tend 
to equate an employer’s formal policy against retaliation with the actual absence of 
retaliation, despite strong evidence that the two bear little correlation.66 
To justify failing to complain, employees must show specific credible threats of 
retaliation or tangible evidence of the employer’s prior unresponsiveness to harassment 
complaints in order to have their failure to complain excused.67 The court in Walton v. 
 
61 See EEOC, Enforcement Guidance:  Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Harassment by 
Supervisors, EEOC Comp. Man. (BNA), June 18, 1999, N:4075, at 17, available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/harassment.html (an “employee should not necessarily be expected to complain 
to management immediately after the first or second incident of relatively minor harassment”). 
62 See infra text accompanying notes 222-33. 
63 As Camille Hebert points out, courts sometime read the unreasonableness requirement out of the 
second prong altogether, construing it, instead, to require complaints in all cases.  See Hebert, supra note 
52, at 720.  Other courts recite the unreasonableness requirement, but give little if any consideration to 
whether a particular victim’s failure to report was, in fact, unreasonable under the circumstances.  See id. 
64 See infra text accompanying notes 170-77. 
65 Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that “a 
generalized fear of retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment”); Leopold v. Baccarat, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that being “too scared” is not a justification for failing to 
complain without evidence to substantiate such fears); Hill, 218 F.3d at 644 (holding that “apprehension 
does not eliminate the requirement that the employee report harassment”). 
66 See Taylor v. CSX Transp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (“Ms. Taylor has failed to 
explain how she legitimately feared retaliation, particularly given that CSXT’s anti-harassment policy 
specifically forbid retaliation against employees who lodged sexual harassment complaints.”); see also 
infra notes 170-77. 
67 For cases requiring specific retaliation threats, see Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 
(2d Cir. 2001) (“A credible fear [of retaliation] must be based on more than the employee’s subjective 
belief.  Evidence must be produced to the effect that employer has ignored or resisted similar complaints or 
has taken adverse action against employees in response to such complaints.”); Anderson v. Deluxe Homes, 
131 F. Supp. 2d 637, 651 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that warnings from other employees that complaint 
would result in retaliatory firing might make plaintiff’s failure to complain reasonable).  For cases 
considering employer’s prior unresponsiveness, see Childress v. PetsMart, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 705, 709 
(W.D. Tex. 2000) (finding employee’s failure to complain unreasonable despite her testimony that she had 
been told by co-workers than complaining would be futile); Young v. R.R. Morrison & Son, 159 F. Supp. 
2d 921, 927 (N.D. Miss. 2000) (noting that “a plaintiff may bring forward evidence of prior unresponsive 
action by the company or management to actual complaints” as a reason for not complaining).  But see 
Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083-84 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (finding 
plaintiff’s failure to complain due to supervisors’ participation in the harassment and their lack of 
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Johnson & Johnson refused to excuse a three-month delay because the harasser never 
told the plaintiff “her job was in jeopardy” or “threatened her with physical harm.”68 The 
court failed to credit her fear even though the supervisor’s alleged harassment had 
included multiple episodes of “particularly traumatic” forcible rape and several occasions 
on which he showed her his gun.69 Despite the rapes and the gun-brandishing, the lack of 
a direct threat of retaliation reduced her proffered excuse for failing to complain to “an 
unsupported subjective fear that the employee would suffer physical harm at the hands of 
her alleged harasser.”70 Even a harasser’s active efforts to deter a complaint are not 
necessarily sufficient to excuse a victim’s failure to complain.  In Wyatt v. Hunt Plywood 
Co.,71 the plaintiff complained to her direct supervisor, one of the individuals designated 
in the policy to receive complaints.  After she complained, that supervisor joined in the 
harassment of the plaintiff—“continually propositioning [her] for sex and making lewd 
comments”—and warned her not to “go over his head.”72 The Fifth Circuit ruled that the 
plaintiff behaved unreasonably by failing to complain to another designee in the policy, 
and the supervisor’s admonitions did “not excuse her failure to disclose harassment to a 
higher authority.”73 
In general, these cases reflect a widespread refusal by courts to consider context 
when making determinations about the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s behavior.  New 
employees are assumed to be as free to complain as longstanding ones,74 employees are 
presumed to have hindsight knowledge about a pattern of harassment that has only just 
begun,75 and the fear employees report about retaliation is dismissed as overly general 
and subjective.  This acontextual approach effectively makes the failure to immediately 
complain through employer-specified channels per se “unreasonable,” effectively barring 
employees from establishing unlawful harassment. 
 The emphasis in the affirmative defense on prompt complaints by employees has 
spilled over into coworker harassment cases as well, even though the Supreme Court has 
never extended the defense to coworker harassment claims.  Unlike supervisory 
harassment, where the affirmative defense tempers the baseline rule of vicarious liability, 
 
appropriate response to harassment committed by others was unreasonable when complaint procedures 
provided for alternative means of reporting harassment). 
68 Walton, 347 F.3d at 1290. 
69 Id. at 1290. 
70 Id. at 1291 & n.17. 
71 297 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2002). 
72 Id. 
73 Id.; see also Reed v. MBNA Marketing Sys., Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 (D. Me. 2002) 
(refusing to excuse plaintiff’s failure to complain even though her harassing supervisor told her not to tell 
anyone and warned her that his father was good friends with the owner of her company). 
74 See, e.g., Dennis v. State of Nevada, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. Nev. 2003) (concluding that 
plaintiff behaved unreasonably for failing to complain because she “did not want to jeopardize completing 
the probationary period successfully”). 
75 See, e.g., Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (expecting 
plaintiff to complain even before realizing the misconduct would recur and escalate). 
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coworker harassment claims require proof of a negligence-based justification for 
employer liability.  Plaintiffs challenging coworker harassment must show that the 
employer knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to respond with 
prompt and appropriate corrective action.  In the past, proof that the employer knew or 
should have known of the harassment sufficed to establish liability, regardless of how the 
employer learned of the harassment.  In recent years, however, lower courts have applied 
the affirmative defense to coworker harassment as well.  Plaintiffs have been penalized, 
for example, for not reporting coworker harassment through employer channels, even 
when employer knowledge of the harassment can be established some other way.76 Thus, 
all hostile environment claims effectively share a strict time limit on reporting 
harassment, in many cases, even shorter than the one imposed by the statute of 
limitations. 
E. EMPLOYER INTERNAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES AND THE EFFECT ON 
FORMAL RIGHTS-CLAIMING 
One of the most important developments in employment law in recent years is the 
trend toward channeling employee complaints about discrimination into internal dispute 
resolution (“IDR”) processes set up by employers for addressing such concerns.77 
Although the statute’s only explicit administrative exhaustion requirement is to file with 
the EEOC or state administrative agency before suing in court, the prevalence of 
employer IDR processes effectively adds another layer of complaint processing to Title 
VII’s formal rights-claiming regime.  Increasingly, employers obligate, or at least 
strongly encourage, employees to attempt to resolve their discrimination complaints 
internally before taking official legal action.78 
76 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 96 F.3d 1017, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Derringe v. Old Nat’l Bank, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78669, *16-18 (D. Ind. 2006).  Reporting requirements 
are enforced indirectly, as well, through the substantive elements of sexual harassment doctrine.  For 
example, plaintiffs must prove that the conduct they experienced was “unwelcome,” and the failure to 
promptly resist or complain has been used as evidence of welcomeness.  See, e.g., Reed v. Shepherd, 939 
F.2d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 1991) (female police officer’s initial receptiveness to coworkers sexual 
remarks/activities was fatal to her harassment claim). 
77 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Equality and the Forms of Justice, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 51 (2003) 
(“Judicial doctrine has encouraged employers to develop internal dispute resolution and problem solving 
mechanisms. . . .  Employers have institute a wide range of dispute resolution processes, including ombuds 
officers, mediation, peer review, open door policies, and arbitration.”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29 (2006) (“[M]anagement 
lawyers and consultants have frequently urged employers to adopt internal dispute resolution procedures, 
zero-tolerance policies, and diversity and sexual harassment training programs.”). 
78 See, e.g., Lowry v. Regis Salons Corp., 2006 WL 2583224 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2006) (plaintiff 
was required to sign an acknowledgement form when she was hired stating “that she understood her 
obligation as an employee to promptly report to the appropriate persons activities and/or conduct which 
may constitute harassment”); Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., Inc., 384 F.3d 537, 540 (6th Cir. 2003) (after an 
employee filed an EEOC charge for racial harassment and discrimination, the supervisor called a meeting 
“at which he threatened that it was inappropriate for employees to take complaints outside of Crown 
Motors,” and stated “that ‘all complaints regarding employment should be made internally.’”). 
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This kind of “privatization” of employment discrimination disputes is driven by 
recent legal developments that make IDR policies and procedures all but mandatory and 
integrally tied to Title VII’s liability scheme.  One important catalyst for this trend is the 
Supreme Court’s recent precedent, discussed above, constructing an affirmative defense 
to supervisor sexual harassment claims.79 The first part of the defense requires an 
employer to show that it took reasonable preventive measures, generally construed to 
require the development and distribution of policies and procedures for resolving 
harassment complaints.80 The other part of the affirmative defense, discussed in detail 
above, requires employees to act reasonably to prevent and correct harassment, which 
courts generally interpret to require employees to use such procedures.81 Partly in 
response to these incentives, the privatization of harassment claims has become an 
entrenched part of workplace culture.82 
The trend does not stop with sexual harassment.  Because racial harassment is 
governed by the same liability framework, company harassment policies generally 
encompass racial harassment as well.83 In addition, other legal pressures create 
incentives for employers to develop policies and procedures addressing other types of 
discrimination in addition to harassment.  For example, even though there is no employer 
defense to liability for discrimination involving tangible harm, employers can avoid 
punitive damages by proof of good faith efforts to comply with the law.84 Thus, there are 
strong incentives on employers to create policies and procedures for addressing 
workplace discrimination generally.  Any analysis of rights-claiming under Title VII 
must take into account these developments. 
 Far from solving the problems created by Title VII’s prompt complaint 
requirements, the added layer of internal processes creates added risks for employees.  
Employers broadly encourage employees to use their IDR processes, and employer 
policies promising fair treatment and the refusal to tolerate discrimination encourage 
employees to trust these processes and have high hopes for their outcome.  If, however, 
the results of IDR processes do not provide a satisfactory resolution, employees may be 
worse off in their effort to enforce Title VII rights.85 
An employee who waits to file an EEOC charge while pursuing an internal 
complaint process is likely to be out of luck.  In an early Title VII decision, the Supreme 
 
79 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 742 (1998). 
80 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
81 This part of the affirmative defense is discussed in greater detail above.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 52-76. 
82 See Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 53, at 3. 
83 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 26 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (noting that 
Title VII standards for sexual harassment are the same as those for racial harassment). 
84 See Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). 
85 Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 77, at 28-31 (explaining and further developing critique of employers’ 
internal dispute resolution process for discrimination complaints as skewed to serve the needs of 
employers). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
20
Court ruled that an employee’s pursuit of an internal grievance process does not toll the 
limitations period for filing a claim with the EEOC.  In that case, International Union of 
Electric Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.,86 an employee initially sought to resolve a 
discrimination concern internally, through the dispute resolution processes established in 
a collective bargaining agreement.  In reasoning that is not limited to collective 
bargaining agreements and applies to all IDR processes for investigating and resolving 
discrimination complaints, the Court ruled that an employee’s participation in an internal 
grievance process does not toll the limitations period for filing a Title VII charge.87 The 
Court was concerned that tolling the formal limitations period would discourage 
employers from attempting to voluntarily resolve such disputes, and viewed such 
processes as wholly distinct from Title VII’s formal enforcement mechanisms. 
 The Court’s reasoning cannot be squared with the past decade’s proliferation of 
IDR processes for resolving discrimination complaints as an integral part of Title VII’s 
legal framework.  The courts’ continuing refusal to toll Title VII’s limitations period for 
time spent trying to resolve discrimination complaints internally seriously jeopardizes 
employees’ formal assertion of rights.88 Employers have a great deal of control over the 
length of time such processes take, whether employees use them, and the extent of 
employees’ reliance on and hopes for such processes.  In this environment, it is all too 
easy for such internal processes to run out the clock on asserting rights through the 
formal statutory mechanisms. 
 
* * *
Taken together, the body of doctrine discussed above places tough requirements 
on employees to quickly ascertain and challenge any discrimination they encounter in the 
workplace if they are to preserve their Title VII rights.  The law leaves very little 
allowance for difficulties perceiving and recognizing discrimination, hesitation in 
reporting and challenging it, and delay for the sake of pursuing other avenues first.  The 
law effectively reserves Title VII’s substantive rights to those employees who are hyper-
vigilant about noticing, comprehending and challenging violations of their rights.  As the 
next section demonstrates, such an employee is far from the norm. 
II. THE REALITIES OF PERCEIVING AND CLAIMING DISCRIMINATION 
The procedural framework for securing Title VII rights is strict by any definition, 
but especially so when considered against the backdrop of research about how people 
actually perceive and respond to workplace discrimination.  Unlike the worthy claimant 
the law assumes, real targets of bias often do not immediately “know” when they have 
been discriminated against, and even when they do perceive bias, they rarely challenge it 
 
86 429 U.S. 229 (1976). 
87 Id. at 236-40. 
88 See, e.g., Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
limitations period began to run “not when the grievance procedure to correct that decision was terminated,” 
but when the initial decision to convert the pension system “was made and communicated to him”). 
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promptly, if at all.  Legal doctrine predicated upon a false picture of employee behavior 
undermines Title VII’s rights-claiming regime and eviscerates the law’s substantive 
protections. 
A. DIFFICULTIES PERCEIVING DISCRIMINATION 
Title VII’s short statute of limitations and strict timely filing doctrines presume a 
legal subject who quickly perceives and recognizes unlawful discrimination when it 
strikes her.  At a deeper level, the strictness of Title VII doctrine in weeding out potential 
claimants reflects judicial skepticism of rights-claiming in this area and a fear of hyper-
vigilant employees who are too quick to infer discrimination.  Such skepticism is widely 
shared in popular culture, which has developed negative terms for women and people of 
color who place too much emphasis on discrimination, terms such as “femininazi” and 
“playing the race card.” 
 In reality, however, perceiving discrimination is more complicated.89 Evidence 
from social psychology suggests that the under-perception of discrimination is more the 
norm than hyper-vigilance.90 For example, even when women experience behavior that 
objectively qualifies as sexual harassment, many do not perceive that they have been 
sexually harassed.91 This example is part of a broader and widely documented 
phenomenon whereby members of stigmatized groups acknowledge that their group 
experiences discrimination, but deny that have experienced it individually.92 
89 This section summarizes social psychology research on perceiving discrimination described in 
greater detail in Deborah L. Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psychological Forces 
and Legal Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. ___ (forthcoming 2007) 
[hereinafter Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism]. 
90 See, e.g., Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving 
and Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 803-06 (2006) [hereinafter Kaiser & Major, A
Social Psychological Perspective] (describing as “sparse,” “empirical evidence that members of historically 
disadvantaged groups claim discrimination when none exists, or even that they are especially sensitive to 
and vigilant for discrimination,” and summarizing studies supporting the view that people err on the side of 
denying discrimination); Brenda Major & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Perceiving and Claiming Discrimination, in 
HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 285, 286-87 (Laura 
Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (“members of disadvantaged groups typically miss, 
underestimate, or deny the extent to which they are personally targets of prejudice”); Elizabeth H. Dodd et 
al., Respected or Rejected:  Perceptions of Women Who Confront Sexist Remarks, 45 SEX ROLES 567, 
568-69 (2001) (summarizing research showing that women tend to explain away sexism, despite evidence 
that it has occurred); Charles Stangor et al., Reporting Discrimination in Public and Private Contexts, 82 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 69, 69 (2002) (“[P]rior research has shown that members of stigmatized 
groups are in many cases unlikely to report that negative events that occur to them are due to 
discrimination, even when this is a valid attribution for the event.”). 
91 See, e.g., Vicki J. Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual Harassment, 84 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 390 (1999) [hereinafter Magley, Outcomes of Self-Labeling]; see also Beth A. Quinn, The 
Paradox of Complaining:  Law, Humor, and Harassment in the Everyday Work World, 25 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 1151, 1156 (2000) [hereinafter Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining] (rejecting lack of legal 
understanding as a sufficient explanation for women’s resistance to label their experiences sexual 
harassment). 
92 See Donald M. Taylor et al., The Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy:  Perceiving My 
Group, But Not Myself, to Be a Target for Discrimination, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254 
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As this phenomenon suggests, perceiving discrimination involves complex social 
and psychological processes.  Rather than encouraging people to quickly recognize 
discrimination when they experience it, numerous psychological processes interfere with 
the perception of discrimination, especially when it occurs subtly rather than overtly.93 
1. The Influence of Ideology 
 People have a widely shared desire to believe that the world is fundamentally just 
in the sense that individual merit determines individual outcomes, or in other words, 
people reap what they sow.94 Perceiving oneself as a victim of discrimination conflicts 
with this world view.  In mainstream United States culture, beliefs in a just world are 
pervasive and strongly influence perceptions of discrimination.95 This ideology is 
especially influential in shaping perceptions of discrimination under circumstances where 
discrimination is subtle and ambiguous, rather than overt and clear-cut, as is often the 
case.96 
(1990); John T. Jost, Negative Illusions:  Conceptual Clarification and Psychological Evidence Concerning 
False Consciousness, 16 POL. PSYCHOL. 397, 404-05 (1995) [hereinafter Jost, Negative Illusions].  See also 
Faye Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 371, 372-73 (1984) (describing 
bedrock study in this literature from 1978 in which 400 male and female workers rated their personal job 
satisfaction and grievances similarly, despite objective evidence that the women in the study were 
discriminated against) [hereinafter Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination]; James M. Olson & 
Carolyn L. Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING 
PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 157, 163-64 (John T. Jost & Brenda 
Major eds., 2001) [hereinafter Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation] (explaining that the 
discrepancy holds true for stigmatized groups generally and “crosses racial, gender, and economic 
boundaries,” and noting that “it is a statistical impossibility for all members of a group to experience less 
discrimination than other members”). 
93 See, e.g., Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem:  A Transactional Model, 14 EUR. REV. OF 
SOC. PSYCH. 77, 81 (2003) [hereinafter Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem] (stating that people are 
much less likely to perceive bias when prejudice cues are subtle and not overt); Major et al., Attributions to 
Discrimination and Self-Esteem:  Impact of Group Identification and Situational Ambiguity, 39 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 220, 230 (2002) [hereinafter Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination]
(“[A]mbiguous situations appear to be especially difficult for members of stigmatized groups.  Because 
they disguise prejudice, they create uncertainty and interfere with the target’s ability to discount their own 
role in producing negative outcomes.”). 
94 See, e.g., Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation, supra note 92, at 159-63.  Just 
world theory was originally used to explain how people react to the suffering of others, but subsequent 
work has demonstrated the theory’s force in explaining how people make sense of their own suffering.  Id. 
at 159-60. 
95 See Carolyn L. Hafer & James M. Olson, Beliefs in a Just World, Discontent, and Assertive 
Actions by Working Women, 19 PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 30, 35 (1993) (explaining that 
people who hold strong beliefs in a just world tend to minimize discrimination and blame themselves for 
poor outcomes); Kaiser & Major, A Social Psychological Perspective, supra note 90, at 806-08 (describing 
“the meritocratic worldview” and its prevalence in mainstream U.S. culture).  Particular workplaces in 
which the belief in meritocracy is especially strong may be especially likely to discourage perceptions of 
bias against persons who do not rise to the top of the organization.  See id. at 810-12. 
96 Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation, supra note 92, at 163. 
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Women and persons of color who adhere to a belief in a “just world” are less 
likely to attribute negative outcomes in their lives to discrimination and more likely to 
internalize the reasons for disappointing outcomes instead.97 For example, research on 
stigmatized social groups has found that members of these groups who “endorsed the 
ideology of individual mobility,” i.e., agreed with such statements as “[a]dvancement in 
American society is possible for individuals of all ethnic groups,” were less likely to 
interpret negative events as discriminatory than their cohorts who did not adhere to these 
beliefs.98 
The inhibiting effect of “just world” ideology on perceptions of discrimination is 
particularly pronounced for members of disadvantaged groups because it rationalizes and 
internalizes broader patterns of disadvantage for members of these groups.99 In contrast, 
the belief in a just world may have the opposite effect on members of privileged groups 
by setting up an expectation of continued privilege that causes members of these groups 
to suspect extrinsic and unfair considerations when they experience negative outcomes.100 
Blaming oneself, rather than discrimination, for disappointing life events has the 
appeal of bolstering an individual’s sense of control and avoiding the label of “victim.”101 
For adherents to just world ideology, victimhood is a stigmatized identity.102 The desire 
to see oneself as in control of one’s life helps explain the paradoxical finding that many 
more people acknowledge widespread discrimination against their social group than 
perceive discrimination against themselves individually.103 
97 Id. at 161; Kaiser & Major, A Social Psychological Perspective, supra note 90, at 810-12 
(discussing research finding that low-status groups’ attributions to discrimination decrease when targets are 
first primed with messages promoting a meritocratic worldview). 
98 Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note 93, at 82 (discussing research on women and 
Latino/a-Americans).  The authors add, “They were also less likely to blame discrimination when a higher-
status confederate (European American; man) rejected them for a desirable role.”  Id. 
99 See Kaiser & Major, A Social Psychological Perspective, supra note 90, at 808 (“Because 
endorsing this meritocratic worldview results in seeing low-status group members as deserving of their 
poor outcomes, the more low-status group members endorse these beliefs, the more they will minimize the 
extent to which they face discrimination.”). 
100 Id. at 808-09 (“[B]ecause endorsing the meritocratic worldview leaves members of high-status 
groups feeling entitled to their privileged position, the more they endorse the worldview, the more sensitive 
they will be towards perceiving signs of reverse discrimination.”); see also Major et al., Prejudice and Self 
Esteem, supra note 93, at 82 (suggesting that members of high status groups, such as white males, are more 
likely to attribute negative outcomes to discrimination when they hold a belief in a just world). 
101 Kaiser & Major, A Social Psychological Perspective, supra note 90, at 808 (discussing the 
psychological benefits of a meritocratic worldview, including a sense of control over one’s destiny). 
102 See Magley, Outcomes of Self Labeling, supra note 91, at 392-93 (explaining that the ideology 
of individual responsibility “turn[s] the word victim into a synonym for failure or irresponsibility”); see 
also Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining, supra note 91, at 1173 (explaining that complaining of sexual 
harassment saddles the complainant with a “stigmatized” identity, and quoting one manager as stating that 
“making a claim of sexual harassment ‘is sort of like rape, it tends to reflect as badly on the person filing 
the report as it does the person being accused’”). 
103 Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation, supra note 92, at 164. 
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Blaming oneself rather than discrimination also enables people to avoid assessing 
blame on others.  People are reluctant to perceive discrimination when doing so requires 
them to identify an individual discriminator.104 The reluctance to blame others also helps 
explain why so many people who recognize widespread discrimination against their 
social group nevertheless deny that they have experienced it personally.  Perceiving 
discrimination directed at an individual requires an identifiable villain, while recognizing 
systematic but anonymous discrimination does not. 
 While these widely shared ideologies discourage the perception of discrimination 
directed against individuals, other ideologies may encourage attributions to 
discrimination.  For example, a strong identification with one’s social group tends to 
encourage the perception of discrimination under conditions where prejudice cues are 
subtle or ambiguous.105 People who strongly identify with members of their social group 
are more likely to suspect discrimination in situations where bias takes a subtle form.106 
As this research suggests, knowledge of discrimination is far more complicated 
than Title VII’s timely filing regime assumes.  Far from being fixed and stable, it is 
mediated and filtered by an individual’s belief system.  Certain widely held belief 
systems encourage the denial of individualized discrimination, particularly the belief in a 
just world, the ideology of individual responsibility, and the reluctance to blame others. 
2. Limited Information and Information-Processing 
 The likelihood of perceiving discrimination is highly dependent on the 
information available.  Under ordinary circumstances, information suggestive of 
discrimination trickles in piece-meal, in anecdotal fashion, through the sharing of 
experiences with colleagues.  Short of litigation and the judicially supervised discovery 
process, employees very rarely have access to aggregate data showing across-the-board 
treatment of employees by race, gender and other protected characteristics.  With respect 
to employee compensation, for example, organization-wide data broken down by gender 
or race is generally unavailable.107 
104 See Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, supra note 92.  See also Jacquie D. 
Vorauer & Sandra M. Kumhyr, Is this About You or Me?  Self-Versus Other-Directed Judgments and 
Feelings in Response to Intergroup Interaction, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 706 (2001) 
(reporting results of a study in which a member of a racial minority who interacted with a prejudiced white 
person felt badly after the interaction, but attributed the negative feelings to internal reasons rather than the 
other person’s prejudice). 
105 See Brenda Major, From Social Inequality to Personal Entitlement:  The Role of Social 
Comparisons, Legitimacy Appraisals, and Group Membership, 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
293, 331 (1994) [hereinafter Major, From Social Inequality]; Major et al., Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra 
note 93, at 95. 
106 Interestingly, identification with one’s social group had no effect on perception of individually-
directed discrimination when conditions suggestive of prejudice were either blatant or nonexistent.  See 
Major et al., Attributions to Discrimination, supra note 93, at 228. 
107 See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, “Love, Sex and Politics?  Sure. Salary?  No Way”:  
Workplace Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 167, 168, 171 (2004) (stating that 
social norms discourage discussion of salaries in the workplace and observing that one-third of U.S. private 
sector employers have policies which, although illegal, bar employees from discussing their salaries, while 
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Yet aggregate data is extremely important in enabling people to recognize 
individual instances of discrimination.  Without data showing across-the-board 
disparities, people are more likely to hypothesize nondiscriminatory reasons for 
individual disparities and less likely to perceive discrimination.108 With respect to pay 
disparities, for example, slight variations in any of the criteria used for setting pay are 
likely to be perceived as excusing gender gaps in pay, while data documenting 
organization-wide disparities greatly increases the likelihood of perceiving pay 
discrimination.109 
Not only the information itself but also how it is presented and formatted strongly 
influences peoples’ ability to perceive discrimination.  Presenting information on 
disparities in an aggregate, across-the-board format makes it much more likely that 
people will perceive discrimination than showing them the same information in case-by-
case format.110 Apparently, the case-by-case formatting leads people to hypothesize 
neutral, nondiscriminatory justifications, while the all-at-once, aggregate format makes 
such speculation less likely.111 
Both in terms of the information available and the way the available information 
is likely to be presented, real-life conditions are much more likely to obscure rather than 
encourage employees’ perceptions of discrimination. 
3. Within-Group Comparisons and Sense of Entitlement 
 A third influence on the likelihood of perceiving discrimination is individual 
sense of entitlement.  In order to perceive that they have experienced unfair 
discrimination, people must believe that they are entitled to better treatment.112 A
person’s sense of entitlement, in turn, is shaped by the process of social comparison and 
consideration of the treatment others receive, which provides information about what 
outcomes are possible and deserved.113 Accordingly, the selection of comparators in this 
process is critical in shaping perceptions of fairness. 
 
many others communicate an expectation of salary confidentiality); see also id. at 178 (“Employees 
observe wage differentials without the full information necessary to evaluate the justifications for differing 
wages.”). 
108 See Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, supra note 92, at 377-78; Major, From 
Social Inequality, supra note 105, at 332 (“It is easier to see discrimination on the collective level than on 
an individual level.”). 
109 Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, supra note 92, at 377-78. 
110 See Faye Crosby et al., Cognitive Biases in the Perception of Discrimination:  The Importance 
of Format, 14 SEX ROLES 637, 644-46 (1986) [hereinafter Crosby et al., Cognitive Biases]; Major et al., 
Prejudice and Self-Esteem, supra note 93, at 81. 
111 Crosby et al., Cognitive Biases, supra note 110, at 645. 
112 See Major, From Social Inequality, supra note 105, at 293-94 (1994) (“[B]eliefs about 
entitlement are a critical determinant of how members of social groups react affectively, evaluatively, and 
behaviorally to their socially distributed outcomes.”). 
113 See id. at 298-300 (explaining that feelings of entitlement shape expectations and perceptions 
of social justice, and that the process of social comparison is critical in shaping peoples’ sense of 
entitlement). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
26
In the process of developing a sense of entitlement through comparison to others, 
the generalized tendency to draw comparisons within one’s social group has the effect of 
suppressing the likelihood that women and people of color will perceive bias.  For 
example, working women are likely to compare their treatment to other working women 
due to structural features of the workplace that highlight women’s similarity and 
proximity to one another.114 Yet the very features of women’s lives that create sufficient 
similarity to encourage within-gender comparisons—the under-valuation of women’s 
work, vertical and horizontal job segregation, and the disproportionate responsibility for 
caretaking and family responsibilities—are likely to promote a lowered expectation of 
entitlement by virtue of the comparison to other women.115 The use of same-gender 
comparisons to evaluate the fairness of one’s pay, for example, leads women to expect 
lower pay because women overall receive lower pay.116 Conversely, men compare their 
pay to that of other men, which leads them to expect higher pay.117 In this way, the very 
existence of widespread discrimination against one’s social group has the potential to 
suppress the perception of discrimination against individuals within that social group.118 
In a similar dynamic, a person’s current sense of entitlement is also shaped by his 
or her past treatment.  A person who is used to being paid less is less likely to experience 
lower pay as unfair or problematic.119 Consequently, prior discrimination can become 
self-reinforcing by disguising the unfairness of present treatment through the lowered 
expectations set by past treatment.120 
Data on gender differences in pay expectations illustrates how such processes 
suppress the likelihood that women will perceive pay discrimination.  In studies asking 
men and women to determine the amount of compensation they would receive for 
performing specified tasks, women paid themselves 61% of what men did.121 Similarly, 
when the compensation was set first and subjects were told to work as long as they 
thought appropriate for that level of pay, women worked one-third longer than the 
men.122 Women’s suppressed sense of entitlement, strongly influenced by the process of 
 
114 See Olson & Hafer, Tolerance of Personal Deprivation, supra note 92, at 166-67; Major, From 
Social Inequality, supra note 105, at 302-303, 314-15. 
115 Major, From Social Inequality, supra note 105, at 314-15. 
116 See id. at 320-21 (explaining that women’s default within-group comparison reference point 
leads to lower expectations for pay than men have). 
117 See id. at 321-22 (“Women and men estimate their personal deserving against a (same) sex-
stereotyped judgment standard. . . .  Because women and people doing ‘women’s jobs’ are typically paid 
less than men and people doing ‘men’s jobs,’ women estimate their personal deserving and evaluate their 
outcomes against a lower reference standard for pay than do men.”). 
118 See id. at 294. 
119 See id. at 307-08, 321-22. 
120 See id. at 303 (“[P]eople typically feel they deserve the same treatment or outcomes that they 
have received in the past or that others like themselves receive.”). 
121 See Jost, Negative Illusions, supra note 92, at 404; see also Major, From Social Inquiry, supra 
note 105, at 313-17. 
122 See Jost, Negative Illusions, supra note 92, at 404-05. 
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social comparison, plays an important role in explaining the gap between the general 
recognition of discrimination against women as a group and the tendency to deny 
individual experience with discrimination.123 
All of these processes greatly complicate the ability of employees to quickly 
recognize when they have experienced discrimination.  The failure of Title VII law to 
engage these issues—most recently in the Ledbetter decision—leaves employees greatly 
impaired in their ability to enforce their substantive rights.  With respect to pay 
discrimination in particular, the subject of the Ledbetter ruling, this research suggests that 
employees are highly unlikely to perceive pay discrimination in time to assert their Title 
VII rights.124 More broadly, the difficulties identified in this literature with respect to 
perceiving discrimination bode poorly for rights-claiming with respect to discrimination 
claims generally. 
B. DIFFICULTIES CHALLENGING DISCRIMINATION 
In addition to the obstacles to perceiving discrimination, social scientists have 
documented a host of barriers to challenging it.  These barriers are multi-faceted, but we 
focus here on the well-established reluctance of victims to file formal complaints in the 
harassment context and the specific fear of retaliation that inhibits complaining about all 
forms of discriminatory conduct. 
1. Actual Versus Predicted Responses to Bias 
 Even persons who accurately perceive that they have experienced discrimination 
face additional obstacles to publicly confronting the experience and reporting it.  Social 
psychologists have observed a significant gap between the ability to privately recognize 
an experience as discriminatory and the ability or willingness to publicly label it such.125 
This gap defies expectations of most individuals about how they believe they would react 
to discrimination in the workplace.  In one study, for example, the vast majority of the 
female subjects predicted that when confronted with three blatantly sexist comments by a 
male colleague, they would challenge the colleague directly.126 Subjects in the same 
study, however, did not in fact challenge the very same remarks when actually subjected 
to them.127 Researchers concluded that women’s silence relative to their anticipated 
 
123 See Major, From Social Inequality, supra note 105, at 294-96, 321. 
124 See id. at 325-26 (noting that even when people are aware that women receive less pay than 
men, they tend to believe that differences in marketability, commitment to the workforce, job 
responsibilities, job performance and job qualifications, rather than discrimination, explain the disparity, 
even when they do not). 
125 See, e.g., Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, A Stress and Coping Perspective on Confronting 
Sexism, 28 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 168 (2004); see also Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
93 (2005) (summarizing research on victims’ ability to label discrimination). 
126 Janet K. Swim & Lauri L. Hyers, “Excuse Me—What Did You Just Say?!”:  Women’s Public 
and Private Responses to Sexist Remarks, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 68, 68-88 (1999). 
127 Id. at 79.  Although most women predicted they would confront the comments, id. at 81-83, 
only 45 percent confronted them at all and most of those did so using indirect strategies such as asking the 
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responses reflected both the influence of social constraints and the fear of negative 
judgments if they failed to acquiesce in the harasser’s behavior.128 That women’s actual 
responses to bias are significantly less confrontational than most of them predict has been 
confirmed in other studies, including those designed to replicate employment settings.129 
In those studies, too, researchers found that the women’s nonconfrontational responses 
reflected an awareness of the anticipated costs of complaining rather than an acceptance 
or approval of the conduct.130 These studies depict a reality in which people fail to 
confront discrimination publicly, and instead make strategic decisions about when to 
confront, challenge, or ignore prejudice based primarily on the anticipated consequences 
of their actions.131 
2. Actual Employee Responses to Harassment 
 The best data about how real employees respond to discrimination comes in the 
sexual harassment context, since only there does the law officially require internal 
grievances as a prerequisite to vindicating rights.  Despite the law’s insistence on using 
employer grievance procedures, however, sexual harassment victims have traditionally 
tended not to utilize internal complaint procedures or otherwise formally report problems 
of harassment, and women are less likely than men to file complaints. 
 Contrary to the law’s expectation that reasonable employees report discrimination 
promptly and assertively,132 studies and surveys reveal, quite to the contrary, that filing a 
complaint with an employer is the least likely response to harassment.  According to a 
1995 study of federal employees, forty-four percent of those who had experienced sexual 
 
commentator to repeat himself or asking a rhetorical question, id. at 75-76.  Only 16 percent of the women 
directly challenged any of the remarks.  See id. at 79. 
128 Id. at 79 (reporting that, among the women who did not engage in confrontation, three-quarters 
judged the commentator as prejudiced and 91 percent held negative views toward him); see also Dodd et 
al., supra note 90, at 567, 569 (discussing women’s fears of how others would perceive them if they 
confronted sexism). 
129 See Julie A. Woodzicka & Marianne LaFrance, Real Versus Imagined Gender Harassment, 57 
J. SOC. ISSUES 15 (2001).  In this study, college-age women were asked to predict how they would respond 
to three sexist questions in a job interview.  A different group of subjects, also college-age women, were 
then placed in a simulated job interview, allegedly to qualify for a research assistant position, and were 
asked the same three sexist questions. 
130 While most women predicted they would feel angry if sexist remarks were made, in fact they 
experienced fear as the predominant emotion.  See id. at 25; cf. id. at 18 (explaining that “targets of sexual 
harassment fear retaliation, reprisals, and even physical harm” and citing literature interpreting sexual 
harassment as a manifestation of intimidation rather than sexuality). 
131 Cf. Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting:  Antecedents and 
Consequences of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230, 237 (2002) (“Our results and 
others . . . also show that reporting can harm the victim in terms of lowered job satisfaction and greater 
psychological distress.  Such results suggest that, at least in certain work environments, the most 
“reasonable’ course of action for the victim is to avoid reporting.”  (citations omitted)). 
132 See supra text accompanying notes 53-76 (describing cases that assume “reasonable” victims 
file complaints of discrimination promptly and assertively). 
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harassment took no action, while only twelve percent reported the conduct to a supervisor 
or other official,133 even though the employer-agencies all maintained written anti-
harassment policies,134 and seventy-eight percent of survey respondents knew about the 
formal complaint channels.135 A study of sexual harassment cases decided in the two 
years following Faragher/Ellerth found that among women who ultimately sued their 
employers for sexual harassment, only 15 percent reported the harassment to their 
employers in a timely manner.136 Other surveys also reveal strikingly low reporting rates 
by employees who have experienced harassing behavior, from as low as three percent in 
one study to no higher than twenty-four percent in others.137 Patterns of low reporting are 
confirmed by employer surveys about the number of complaints they process.  Large 
employers, for example, receive an average of six complaints per year, about two-tenths 
of one percent per 100 employees.138 Yet, harassment surveys covering the same time 
period routinely find that four in ten women report having experienced harassing 
behaviors in the previous two years.139 These numbers suggest a vast gap between the 
occurrence of harassment and the willingness to report it.  The reporting rates do not vary 
dramatically across lines of race, culture, or professional background.140 These rates 
 
133 See, e.g., U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace:  
Trends, Progress, and Continuing Challenges 33 (1995) [hereinafter USMSPB 1995] (reporting that only 
six percent of victims filed a formal complaint). 
134 See id. at 40. 
135 See id. at 33. 
136 See David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your “1-800” Harassment 
Hotline:  An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual 
Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1280 (2001). 
137 See Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in 
Academia and the Workplace, 32 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 162 (1988) (finding that only three percent 
of their sample had attempted to report a sexual harassment experience); see also DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE 1995 SEXUAL HARASSMENT STUDY, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/fact_sheets/ 
sxhas95.html (finding that 24 percent of active-duty military personnel who experienced harassment 
reported it); AMY L. CULBERTSON ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NAVY: RESULTS 
OF THE 1989 NAVY-WIDE SURVEY 17 (1992) (showing victim reporting rates of twenty-four percent for 
enlisted women and twelve percent for female officers); BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE:
THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIORS AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS 71 (1985) 
(describing a survey of workers in Los Angeles in which eighteen percent of women harassed reported it to 
someone in authority); Jean W. Adams et al., Sexual Harassment of University Students, 24 J.C. STUDENT 
PERSONNEL 484, 488-89 (1983) (finding that no student experiencing sexual advances, propositions, or 
extortion reported the incident to university officials); James F. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Blue-Collar Blues:  
The Sexual Harassment of Women Autoworkers, 9 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 271, 286-87 (1982) (showing a 
victim reporting rate of only seven percent for harassed female automobile workers); see also The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991:  Hearing on H.R. 1 Before the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st 
Sess., 172 (1991) (statement of Dr. Freada Klein) (estimating that at least ninety percent of sexual 
harassment victims are unwilling to report the conduct). 
138 See id. 
139 USMSPB 1995, supra note 133, at 13. 
140 See, e.g., Deborah Erdos Knapp et al., Determinants of Target Responses to Sexual 
Harassment:  A Conceptual Framework, 22 ACAD. MGT. REV. 687, 693-94 (1997) (citing research showing 
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have increased relatively little over the past 25 years,141 despite the well-documented 
proliferation of anti-harassment policies and internal grievance procedures.142 
Social scientists have shown that employees do respond to harassing behavior, but 
not in the formal, assertive way that Title VII doctrine requires.  Most responses, 
particularly by women targeted for harassment, tend to be informal and non-
confrontational.143 As with studies of broader forms of discrimination, study participants 
considering hypothetical forms of harassment tend to vastly overestimate the 
assertiveness with which they would respond to real incidents of harassment.  Laboratory 
studies examining participants’ responses to various hypothetical scenarios show that 
many participants believe they would be able to handle the situation themselves.  Fifty-
three percent of respondents in one study indicated they would “have a talk” with the 
harasser.144 Seventy-nine percent of respondents in another study who had “received at 
least one sexual overture from a man at work reported that they were confident they 
could handle future overtures.”145 “Actual victims,” researchers have found, “have been 
 
no relationship between women’s race and their responses to sexual harassment); S. Arzu Wasti & Lilia M. 
Cortina, Coping in Context:  Sociocultural Determinants of Responses to Sexual Harassment, 83 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 394, 402 (2002) (reporting the results of a study comparing responses to 
sexual harassment by professional women in Turkey, professional and working class Anglo-American 
women in the United States, and professional and working class Hispanic women in the United States, and 
finding that “advocacy-seeking,” such as reporting, complaining or speaking with management, was the 
least frequent response by women to sexual harassment).  Even women attorneys, a group one might expect 
to be especially confident in asserting their rights, exhibit a reluctance to publicly claim bias.  See Lilia M. 
Cortina et al., What’s Gender Got to Do with It?  Incivility in the Federal Courts, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
235, 259-60 (2002) (describing a study of female attorneys’ responses to incivility in legal practice, a 
phenomenon with a gender-based dimension); cf. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining!  
The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 
255 (2001) (describing a study of female attorneys’ responses to sex discrimination in the workplace). 
141 Compare U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE: IS IT A PROBLEM? 67, 71 (1981) (three percent of victims reported harassment) [hereinafter 
USMSPB 1981], with U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL 
WORKPLACE: AN UPDATE 27 (1988) (five percent reporting rate) [hereinafter USMSPB 1988] and 
USMSPB 1995 (six percent reporting rate). 
142 See Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 53, at 19-20 (describing nearly universal 
adoption of anti-harassment policies by employers in the last decade). 
143 See generally Grossman, The First Bite is Free, supra note 52, at 723-28 (reviewing literature 
on victim response); see also Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment 
Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 136-41 (2001) (reviewing literature on victim response); 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment—Normative, Descriptive, and 
Doctrinal Interactions:  A Reply to Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
169, 175-84 (2001) (reviewing literature on victim response). 
144 Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations:  
Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 37 (1993) (reviewing 
studies).  For other studies examining hypothetical responses to harassment, see David E. Terpstra & 
Douglas D. Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 10 J. ORG.
BEHAV. 1, 12 (1989) [hereinafter Terpstra & Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions]. 
145 Gutek & Koss, supra note 144, at 37. 
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shown to behave quite differently than research participants or the general public say they 
would behave.”146 
Early studies of how people respond to harassment rated participant responses 
according to their degree of assertiveness and found, in general, that actual victims of 
harassment tend to respond in relatively non-assertive ways.147 They tend, for example, 
to initially ignore harassing behavior and, if it continues, respond with only mild 
retributions or deflections like “I’m not your type.”148 They also rationalize harassment 
by blaming it on non-recurring circumstances, such as a particular outfit, or treat it as a 
joke.149 Women who experience harassment also elect to take quiet, but personally costly 
actions to avoid the harasser, the job, or the situation, over more confrontational steps.150 
Other studies have methodically catalogued the many varied types of responses to 
harassment, showing formal rights-claiming to be a least-favored strategy.  Fitzgerald, 
Swan, and Fischer developed a system for classifying responses as either internally or 
externally focused.151 This study identified common internally-focused responses such as 
endurance (ignoring the harassment), denial (pretending it is not happening), reattribution 
(reinterpreting the situation so it is not defined as harassment), illusory control (blaming 
oneself), and detachment (separation from harasser or situation).152 Common externally-
focused responses included avoidance of the harasser or situation, appeasement (putting 
off the harasser without direct confrontation), and social support (talking to friends or co-
workers about the harassment), as well as more assertive responses like confronting the 
harasser or filing a complaint.  Among the myriad responses identified, the single most 
infrequent one, the authors concluded, was “to seek institutional/organizational relief.  
Victims apparently turn to such strategies as a last resort when all other efforts have 
failed.”153 
Finally, this literature suggests that men and women tend to respond differently to 
harassing behavior, a difference that introduces a gender gap into the gulf between the 
law’s “reasonable” harassment victims and real ones.  Women tend to engage in more 
passive responses to harassment than men, and men are more likely to file formal reports 
 
146 Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him?  The Psychological and Legal 
Implications of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 119 (1995); see also 
Adams et al., supra note 137, at 489 (noting the “marked contrast between what students think they would 
do and what students actually do when confronted with [sexually harassing] behaviors”). 
147 See, e.g., James E. Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment:  A Literature Review, 74 
SOC. SCI. RES. 3 (1989); James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment:  An 
Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource Models, 67 SOC. SCI. Q. 814 (1986) 
[hereinafter Gruber & Bjorn, Women’s Responses]; Gutek & Koss, supra note 144, at 37-38; Terpstra & 
Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions, supra note 144, at 2. 
148 See Gutek & Koss, supra note 144, at 37. 
149 See id. at 38. 
150 See id. 
151 Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 119. 
152 See id. at 119-20. 
153 Id. at 120. 
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or to seek the assistance of lawyers in pursuing a claim.154 As Camille Hebert has 
concluded in a recent article, there is “substantial evidence that . . . women, because their 
differences from men in the manner in which they generally respond to sexual 
harassment, are being disadvantaged by the courts’ definitions of “reasonableness” with 
respect to those responses.”155 This finding suggests that the burdens imposed by Title 
VII’s prompt complaint doctrines may be especially onerous for women. 
3. Reasons for the Reluctance to Challenge Discrimination 
 Research clearly demonstrates that the widespread failure to confront 
discrimination publicly—by confronting the perpetrator, lodging an internal complaint, or 
filing an EEOC charge—is, contrary to expectations, largely driven by an accurate 
perception of the futility, as well as the social and employment costs, of such responses. 
a. The Social Costs of Complaining 
 Social psychologists have documented a disturbing phenomenon in which women 
and people of color who challenge discrimination are disliked for doing so, even when 
their challenge is clearly meritorious.  Such challengers tend to be perceived as 
hypersensitive and/or troublemakers when they confront discrimination.156 A 2001 study 
found that found that African Americans who blamed discrimination for a poor 
performance rating on a test were viewed more negatively than African Americans who 
blamed themselves.157 Regardless of the objective likelihood that the student actually 
experienced discrimination, the predominantly white evaluators consistently rated an 
African-American student more negatively—as a complainer, a troublemaker, 
hypersensitive, emotional, argumentative, and irritating—when he cited discrimination 
rather than his own failings as the reason for the poor performance.158 A follow-up study 
showed that other external attributions—blaming the test methodology, for example—did 
not elicit the same negative reaction as the attribution to discrimination.159 This study 
adds to a substantial body of work establishing the significant social costs incurred by 
 
154 Hebert, supra note 52, at 730. 
155 Id. 
156 See Stangor et al., supra note 90, at 70 (summarizing research demonstrating the social costs of 
reporting discrimination).  See generally Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, supra note 92, at 
170-71 (explaining social norms discussing social norms that depict people who complain as unattractive 
whiners and malingerers, while promoting the ideal of suffering uncomplainingly as noble); Kaiser & 
Miller, supra note 125, at 168, 175 (explaining their own work and citing other studies). 
157 Kaiser & Miller, supra note 125, at 261; see also Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism, supra note 
89 (discussing this and related studies in greater detail). 
158 See id. at 261.  
159 See id. at 259. 
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members of lower-status social groups who challenge discrimination.160 Such social 
penalties are exacted even when there is persuasive evidence of actual discrimination, 
such as direct evidence of an interviewer’s prejudice.161 
Women also experience negative social reactions when they confront sexism.  As 
one recent study showed, the reaction to a woman who challenges sexism is more likely 
to be hostility or amusement than guilt or remorse.162 Another study revealed that 
women who confronted sexist remarks were less well-liked than women who ignored 
them.163 These social penalties are part of a social dynamic of punishing role 
transgressions that occur when a member of a stigmatized group challenges the social 
hierarchy.164 
Social penalties vary inversely with the complainant’s position of privilege with 
respect to the discrimination in question.  For example, in the study just described of 
men’s and women’s reactions to a woman’s response to sexism, researchers found that 
men had a greater inclination to punish the woman’s transgression from prescribed 
gender roles, while other women tended to respond more favorably.165 Other research 
shows that social group membership has a marked influence on the way in which 
individuals react to others who claim discrimination.166 Women and African Americans, 
for example, are more likely to claim discrimination privately, anonymously, or in the 
presence of a member of their same social group, and less likely to do so publicly or in 
the presence of men or white persons.167 Finally, members of low-power or stigmatized 
 
160 See id. at 255-56 (describing research documenting the high costs imposed on members of 
stigmatized groups when they report discrimination); Knapp et al., supra note 140, at 711 (“[A] very 
common negative reaction experienced by women who officially complain is public humiliation.”). 
161 Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the Victim:  The Interpersonal Consequences 
of Blaming Events on Discrimination, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 227 (2003); see also id. at 
228-29 (describing the implications of their own work and citing other research demonstrating that African 
Americans anticipate social backlash if they confront discrimination). 
162 Alexander M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting Prejudice (Literally):  Reactions to 
Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 532, 541 (2003) 
(stating that “the predominant evaluative sentiment resulting from confrontations about gender-biased 
behavior was amusement”). 
163 Dodd et al., supra note 90, at 574-75.  
164 Id. at 568-69 (explaining that when women challenge sexism, the “confrontation goes against 
the more passive, “proper’ female gender role prescribed by society”); cf. Swim & Hyers, supra note 126, 
at 69 (explaining that the dynamic of punishment in response to transgressing gender roles contributes to 
the social constraints that suppress women’s confrontations of sexism). 
165 See id. at 575 
166 Cf. Kaiser & Miller, supra note 140, at 168 (explaining research finding that women are 
reluctant to tell members of high-status groups that they have been discriminated against). 
167 See Stangor et al., supra note 90, at 73; cf. Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls:  
Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 7-8 (1989) (describing 
multiple consciousness, and posing the hypothetical example of a woman of color who shapes her 
responses in a first year criminal law class on rape, depending on the race and gender of the professor). 
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social groups suffer greater social costs when they publicly challenge discrimination than 
do white persons or men, since their claims pose greater threats to the social order.168 
The negative reactions to women and persons of color who complain about 
discrimination go a long way toward explaining why so many discrimination victims 
decline to confront or challenge discrimination.169 The widespread dislike of people who 
challenge discrimination also sets the stage for understanding why retaliation frequently 
follows complaints about discrimination, and how fears of retaliation influence 
employees’ responses to discrimination. 
b. Retaliation as a Cost of Complaining 
 In addition to the social costs discrimination victims both fear and face, employer 
retaliation occurs with enough regularity and severity to support perceptions of the high 
costs of reporting discrimination and the rationality of deciding not to complain.  One 
study of women who filed sex discrimination complaints against their employer with the 
Wisconsin Equal Rights Division showed that 40 percent of the complainants reported 
experiencing retaliation.170 Another study of state employees found that 62 percent of 
those who reported sexual harassment experienced retaliation.171 EEOC charge-filing 
statistics also reveal the depth of the problem of retaliation—25 percent of all charges 
filed under Title VII include a claim of retaliation.172 The pervasiveness of retaliation in 
response to discrimination claims cannot seriously be doubted.173 Moreover, ironically, 
given the law’s expectation of prompt and assertive complaints of discrimination, studies 
 
168 See, e.g., Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor, Why Minority Group Members Perceive or 
Do Not Perceive the Discrimination That Confronts Them:  The Role of Self-Esteem and Perceived 
Control, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 373, 386 (1997) (explaining the results of an earlier study in 
which male subjects did not minimize perceived discrimination, but were highly vigilant in perceiving 
discrimination against themselves); Stangor et al., supra note 90, at 72-73 (discussing the results of control 
groups using men and white persons as discrimination claimants, and showing little evidence of high social 
costs when men and white persons attribute their own negative outcomes to discrimination). 
169 See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 131, at 230-42 (explaining that individuals decide how to 
respond to perceived discrimination strategically, carefully weighing the predicted costs of complaining). 
170 Janet P. Near & Tamila C. Jensen, The Whistleblowing Process:  Retaliation and Perceived 
Effectiveness, 10 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 3, 17 (1983). 
171 Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 122 (describing the results of a study of state employees 
finding that 62 percent of the women who reported sexual harassment experienced retaliation, with the 
most assertive responses often triggering the harshest response). 
172 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics:  FY 1997 Through FY 
2006, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html. 
173 See, e.g., Jane Adams-Roy & Julian Barling, Predicting the Decision to Confront or Report 
Sexual Harassment, 19 J. ORG. BEHAV. 329, 334 (1998) (finding that women who reported sexual 
harassment through formal organizational channels experienced more negative outcomes than those who 
did nothing); Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual Harassment Cases, 24 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 124-25 (2001) (“Many plaintiffs’ lawyers would tell you that once an 
employee complains about discrimination on the job, he or she can usually consider that employment 
relationship over.”).  For a summary of other studies of retaliation, see Brake, supra note 125, at 32-42. 
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universally find that formal complaints of discrimination trigger worse outcomes than 
less assertive responses.174 
Retaliation functions not only to punish persons who complain, but also, perhaps 
more importantly for the success of a rights-claiming system, to suppress future 
challenges to perceived discrimination.  Research clearly establishes that the decision of 
whether to challenge discrimination turns on the careful weighing of the anticipated costs 
and benefits of doing so.175 The failure to report or confront discrimination is a response 
to the expected costs, rather than a determination that the event was not discriminatory or 
harmful.176 The decision not to report is largely based on employees’ fears of retaliation 
and other adverse consequences.177 
174 See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 131, at 230 (describing the results of a study finding that 
even in those situations where women believed that confronting the harassment “made things better,” 
empirical outcomes actually demonstrated the opposite); Matthew S. Hesson-McInnis & Louise F. 
Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment:  A Preliminary Test of an Integrative Model, 27 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 877, 
896 (1997) (“Contrary to conventional wisdom, assertive and formal responses were actually associated 
with more negative outcomes of every sort.”); Shereen G. Bingham & Lisa L. Scherer, Factors Associated 
with Responses to Sexual Harassment and Satisfaction with Outcome, 29 SEX ROLES 239, 247-48 (1993) 
(finding that making a formal or informal complaint produced worse outcomes than alternative responses, 
such as doing nothing, talking to the harasser, or seeking social support); id. at 123 (describing the results 
of another study finding that one-third of the persons who filed formal harassment claims said that it “made 
things worse,” and still another study finding that assertive responses were associated with more negative 
outcomes of every type, even after controlling for the severity of the harassment). 
175 See, e.g., Bergman et al., supra note 131, at 230-42 (discussing research on whistleblowing 
generally, and sexual harassment specifically, finding that persons engage in cost-benefit analysis to decide 
how to respond to wrongdoing). 
176 See, e.g., Stangor et al., supra note 90, at 73 (describing research showing that even when 
persons accurately perceive discrimination, they often choose not to report it because of the social costs of 
doing so); Swim & Hyers, supra note 126, at 68 (describing research on the influence of social context on 
confronting discrimination and concluding that women who choose not to confront sexism act as “strategic 
negotiators of threatening situations”); Kaiser & Miller, supra note 140, at 169 (“The most commonly 
documented barrier to confronting discrimination is interpersonal costs, such as being perceived as a 
troublemaker or experiencing retaliation.”); Knapp et al., supra note 140, at 702 (identifying fear of 
retaliation or isolation and not wanting to be labeled a troublemaker or victim as primary reasons for not 
reporting sexual harassment); cf. Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimination, supra note 92, at 174 (“It 
is . . . widely known that to speak out against injustice is to invite condemnation, and this knowledge, 
added to the other disincentives, can be enough to assure at least temporary silence.”). 
177 See, e.g., Dodd et al., supra note 90, at 569 (explaining that fears of not being believed, being 
retaliated against, being humiliated or of having one’s job negatively affected all contribute to the 
reluctance of women to confront sexism); Fitzgerald et al., supra note 137, at 127 (“Studies of victims 
consistently report that fear of personal or organizational retaliation is the major constraint on assertive 
responding.”); Gutek & Koss, supra note 144, at 39 (explaining that women rarely confront or report sexual 
harassment because they fear that it won’t accomplish anything and fear retaliation); see also Kaiser & 
Miller, supra note 125, at 169 (describing one study finding that women perceive confronting sexist 
remarks to be equally risky to responding with physical aggression against the perpetrator); id. at 168, 175 
(concluding that fear of the consequences explains much of the gap between labeling a behavior as 
discrimination and confronting those responsible or reporting it to others); cf. Knapp et al., supra note 140, 
at 703 (observing that younger workers are more likely to make formal complaints than older workers 
because younger workers have more positive expectations about the reporting process). 
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This literature demonstrates that full and secure protection from retaliation is 
critical for the effectiveness of a rights-claiming system.  The absence of such protection 
only heightens the costs of complaining and further suppresses the already pronounced 
reluctance to assert discrimination claims.  Unfortunately, the law’s treatment of 
employees who do come forward with discrimination complaints provides little 
reassurance to prospective claimants in their own cost-benefit analysis of how to respond. 
III. TITLE VII’S FAILURE TO PROTECT EMPLOYEES WHO ASSERT 
THEIR RIGHTS 
Title VII doctrine makes grand promises about the law’s protection from 
retaliation in exchange for demanding that discrimination plaintiffs promptly assert their 
rights.  The cases are replete with expansive proclamations of the law’s generous 
protection.178 Courts have even pointed to the availability of retaliation claims to belittle 
employees’ excuses for not reporting discrimination.179 But, in reality, Title VII provides 
only partial protection, even less so than a decade ago as a result of recent doctrinal 
developments and workplace trends. 
 Title VII retaliation doctrine restricts protection to those claimants deemed worthy 
of the law’s protections—those who are highly vigilant, not easily deterred from asserting 
their rights, and fully informed of the factual and legal predicates of the alleged 
discrimination before challenging it.  The gap between this ideal and the typical claimant 
marks the limits of the law’s protection against retaliation as a mechanism for 
encouraging discrimination claimants to come forward.  Two recent developments in 
retaliation law merit particular attention:  the materially adverse standard for retaliatory 
acts and the requirement that employee complaints of discrimination rest on a reasonable 
belief in unlawful discrimination.  Both doctrines leave claimants woefully unprotected 
from the very retaliation that stokes fears of complaining and deters prospective 
claimants from challenging discrimination. 
A. THE MATERIALLY ADVERSE REQUIREMENT 
Until the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Company v. White,180 lower courts struggled for years to set the bar for 
determining what types of negative responses suffice to establish unlawful retaliation.  
Some courts limited protection from retaliation to those actions considered “materially 
 
178 See, e.g., Burlington Northern & Santa Fe RR Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2407 (2006) 
(“The anti-retaliation provision seeks to . . . prevent[] an employer from interfering (through retaliation) 
with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees”); Robinson v. 
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (“A primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions [is] [m]aintaining 
unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.”). 
179 See text at notes 63-73; see also Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(ruling that employer threat of retaliation does not excuse failure to file a charge for purposes of tolling the 
limitations period). 
180 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006). 
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adverse,” using fixed lists of employment actions that qualified and those that did not.181 
Other courts eschewed a categorical list and inquired whether the particular action was 
likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity under Title VII.182 Still 
others were more strict, denying any protection from retaliation that fell short of an 
“ultimate employment decision” such as a termination or pay cut.183 This disparity in 
approaches recently prompted the Supreme Court to clarify the level of severity required 
to establish unlawful retaliation. 
 In Burlington Northern, a relatively easy case under any but the strictest test, the 
Supreme Court considered the plight of a woman who was reassigned from her job 
operating a forklift to more demanding manual work and suspended without pay for 37 
days after she complained of gender-based and sexual harassment.184 A divided appellate 
panel ruled that these actions were not materially adverse, but a unanimous en banc court 
disagreed, with even the dissenting judges from the original panel changing their minds 
after reargument.185 
In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court affirmed the en banc decision 
and clarified the threshold of adversity necessary for a retaliation claim.  The Court 
rejected arguments by the employer and the United States that the standard for a claim 
under Title VII’s provision banning retaliation should be construed as strictly as the ban 
on discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.186 Instead, the Court 
required that the challenged action be “materially adverse,” which it defined to include 
employer actions that “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or 
supporting a charge of discrimination.’”187 In a confusing twist, the Court effectively 
 
181 These courts, like the Sixth Circuit decision in Burlington Northern, typically used the same 
standard as Title VII’s substantive provision, Section 703(e), which requires a materially adverse change in 
the terms, conditions or benefits of employment.  See, e.g., Burlington Northern, 364 F.3d at 795; Von 
Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997). 
182 See, e.g., Washington v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); Rochon 
v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
183 See, e.g., Mattern v. Easstman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); Manning v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997). 
184 Her pay was later reinstated for that 37 day period, but she testified that the deprivation of pay 
during that time caused her financial and psychological hardship.  126 S. Ct. at 2417-18. 
185 364 F.3d 789 (en banc). 
186 The two sections are structured differently.  Section 703(a) ties the unlawful practices covered 
to actions taken in the workplace.  See Section 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer—(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . .”).  The retaliation provision is 
not so limited.  See Section 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
subchapter.”). 
187 126 S. Ct. at 2415. 
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adopted the most lenient of the lower court standards, but used the somewhat tougher 
“materially adverse” terminology to describe it. 
 The fairness of any “objective” reasonableness standard depends on the assumed 
attributes and behaviors of the hypothetical “reasonable” person.  The Court’s somewhat 
cryptic opinion contained hints as to its vision of such a person:  a relatively thick-
skinned employee who is not easily deterred from taking an assertive stand against 
discrimination.  The Court concluded that the jury could have reasonably found that the 
plaintiff’s 37-day suspension without pay and reassignment to more arduous and “dirtier” 
labor would be likely to deter a reasonable employee from complaining, but that “trivial 
harms,” “petty slights,” and “minor annoyances” would not.188 The opinion suggests that 
“the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing,” and 
“‘snubbing’ by supervisors and coworkers” fall on the trivial side of the line.189 
Reasonable employees, in other words, are resilient, self-sufficient, and willing to risk the 
loss of congenial relationships at work in exchange for the assertion of civil rights. 
 To its credit, the Court did recognize that the reasonableness of employee 
behavior should be evaluated from the perspective of “a reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s position.”  Thus, the Court noted, while a retaliatory schedule change may 
make little difference to some employees, a young mother with school age children might 
well be deterred from complaining by such schedule changes.190 But this example 
nevertheless reveals the Court’s default view of a reasonable employee as one who, 
absent special circumstances, withstands social ostracism and workplace annoyances and 
boldly asserts anti-discrimination rights, with little regard for all but the most serious 
consequences. 
 Burlington Northern is still a relatively new decision, but early indicators suggest 
that lower courts continue to expect the reasonable employee to endure a substantial 
degree of adversity for the sake of challenging discrimination.191 Although the Court 
explicitly rejected a “tangible harm” requirement for retaliation claims, a number of 
recent lower court decisions have expressed skepticism that anything short of that would 
deter reasonable employees from complaining.  For example, in Higgins v. Gonzales,192 
188 Id. at 2415.  Eric Schnapper has observed that, even though the Court in Burlington Northern 
clearly indicated that the question of whether employer conduct is materially adverse is a question for the 
jury, most lower courts continue to treat it as an issue of fact for the jury to decide.  See Eric Schnapper, 
Burlington Northern v. White in the Lower Courts:  An  Interim Report 4-5 (Apr. 3, 2007) (on file with 
author) (reporting on case law in the first nine months after Burlington) [hereinafter Schnapper, Interim 
Report].  The distinction is an important one.  Of the cases not involving lost wages, courts that treated the 
issue as a question of law found the retaliation to be lawful about 80% of the time, while those that made it 
a question of fact virtually always found sufficient evidence to support a jury determination of unlawful 
retaliation.  Id. at 5. 
189 Id. at 2415. 
190 Id. at 2415-16. 
191 In the first nine months after Burlington Northern, “about half of the lower court decisions 
reported in Westlaw have held that Title VII permitted the particular retaliatory actions allegedly engaged 
in by the defendant employer.”  Schnapper, Interim Report, supra note 188. 
192 481 F.3d 578, 590 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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the Eighth Circuit ruled that withholding mentoring or supervision did not meet the 
standard without proof that the disparate treatment had an actual impact on the plaintiff’s 
employment situation.193 Even transfer to a lateral position in a different city would not 
suffice.194 The court instead dismissed the plaintiff’s concerns about having to start over 
in a new job and move her family to a new school setting as “the normal inconveniences 
associated with any transfer,” emphasizing the lack of proof that her new duties were 
“more difficult, less desirable or less prestigious.”195 
Courts also have found negative job evaluations insufficiently adverse absent 
proof of tangible harm.  In Halfacre v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.,196 the plaintiff allegedly 
received less favorable performance reviews after complaining of race discrimination in a 
promotion decision.  The appellate court ruled that a lower performance evaluation might 
deter a reasonable employee from complaining of discrimination because it could affect 
promotion and earning potential, but remanded the case to determine whether the lower 
evaluations had “actually impacted [the plaintiff’s] wages or promotion potential.”197 
Other courts simply presume that negative job evaluations do not cause tangible harm, 
putting the burden on plaintiffs to show that the negative evaluation would have 
dissuaded a reasonable employee from complaining—a paradoxical quest given that the 
plaintiff has complained in that very case.198 
The post-Burlington Northern cases also seem to pay little heed to individual 
circumstances that might make certain employees especially sensitive to particular 
adverse actions.  For example, courts have found scheduling decisions and job 
reassignments to fail the materially adverse standard, without inquiring into the reasons 
such decisions mattered to the plaintiff.  For example, in McGowan v. City of Eufala,199 
the plaintiff’s request to transfer from the night shift to the day shift was denied after she 
supported her coworker’s discrimination charge.  Because there was no difference in the 
pay, benefits or arduousness of the tasks assigned, the court found that the denial was not 
materially adverse.200 Contrary to Burlington Northern’s sensitivity to how the plaintiff’s 
 
193 Id. at 585-86, 590. 
194 The court in this case took issue with plaintiff’s allegation of retaliatory transfer since her 
original position was only for a two-year term.  However, the court opined that lateral transfer to another 
city still would not have been adverse if her move had qualified as a “transfer” rather than a new hire. 
195 Id. at 591. 
196 No. 05-6619, 2007 WL 1028860, at *9 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007). 
197 Id. (reading Burlington Northern’s discussion of the exclusion of an employee from a weekly 
training lunch as a materially adverse act to mean that “markedly lower performance-evaluation scores that 
significantly impact an employee’s wages or professional advancement are also materially adverse.  The 
question is whether that is the case here.”). 
198 Kennedy v. Guthrie Public Schools, 2007 WL 895145 at 7 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2007) 
(“[Plaintiff] has failed to demonstrate that the Superintendent’s letter would have dissuaded a reasonable 
employee from pursuing his rights under Title VII—which is exactly what [plaintiff] did in this case.”). 
199 472 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2006). 
200 Id. at 740-43.  The court also supported this result by stating that the plaintiff possessed 
insufficient clerical skills to meet the requirements of the day shift and that a similar request had been 
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circumstances might bear on the hardship of schedule changes, the court’s opinion did 
not discuss the plaintiff’s particular circumstances or the reasons underlying her desire to 
switch to the dayshift.201 Instead, the court belittled the significance of the scheduling 
decision, describing the plaintiff’s desire to switch to the day shift as “purely for personal 
reasons” and “an undefined subjective preference.”202 Likewise, in Reis v. Universal City 
Development Partners, Limited,203 the court disregarded the employee’s particular 
circumstances in evaluating the adversity of the retaliatory action.  In that case, the court 
ruled that the denial of the plaintiff’s request to transfer to a position where she could 
work indoors to accommodate a congenital heart condition was not materially adverse 
because it did not negatively impact the plaintiff’s pay, opportunities for advancement, or 
prestige.204 The court did not discuss the medical concerns prompting the transfer 
request. 
 While these decisions are in tension with Burlington Northern’s call for context, 
other anti-plaintiff decisions follow Burlington Northern’s lead by minimizing the 
importance of social costs.  The Court in Burlington Northern indicated that snubbing 
and social ostracism would rarely deter a reasonable employee from challenging 
discrimination.  Citing this part of the Court’s opinion, lower courts have rejected 
retaliation claims alleging social ostracism and harassment that do not result in tangible 
harm.  For example, in McGowan,205 the retaliatory harassment of the plaintiff’s son and 
his girlfriend was deemed insufficiently adverse because it was not directed at the 
plaintiff herself, thereby constructing the reasonable employee as someone who is 
exclusively concerned with herself and her job and not the welfare of persons close to 
her.206 
Courts are dismissive of social ostracism even when it does target the plaintiff, 
absent a showing of tangible harm.  For example, in Halfacre,207 the court ruled that 
ostracism by management would be sufficient only if plaintiff could “establish that 
 
denied before the plaintiff supported her coworker’s claim.  Id. at 743.  However, these facts, if true, go to 
the very different issue of causation, which is an independent element of a retaliation claim.   
201 See also Higgins, 481 F.3d at 590-91 (stating that the “normal inconveniences” associated with 
relocating and establishing new contacts at a job are not alone sufficient to qualify as materially adverse 
actions, absent evidence that the new job required more difficult or less desirable duties or was less 
prestigious). 
202 Id. at 743.  And yet, as Professor Schnapper pointedly observed, “federal judges would resign 
on mass if Congress required them to work on a night shift.”  Schnapper, Interim Report, supra note 188, at 
12. 
203 442 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (M.D. Fla. 2006). 
204 Although the claim was brought under the Family Medical Leave Act and the Florida Civil 
Rights Act, the court borrowed the Burlington Northern standard on the issue of material adversity. 
205 472 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2006). 
206 Id. at 743.  The alleged harassment included citing them for having unleashed dogs and serving 
them with arrest warrants based on this citation.  Id. at 739. 
207 No. 05-6619, 2007 WL 1028860, at *9 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007). 
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management’s conduct was more than ‘simple lack of good manners.’”208 Together, 
these decisions depict the “reasonable” claimant as one who is thick-skinned, resilient, 
and undeterred by “[n]ormally petty slights, minor irritations, or the simple lack of 
civility” in pursuing non-discrimination rights.209 They contrast starkly with the social 
science research discussed in the prior section, demonstrating that the fear of social 
ostracism does indeed deter people from challenging discrimination. 
 The confident assertions by courts that certain actions would not deter a 
reasonable employee from complaining are remarkable given that they fail to cite any 
empirical evidence on how typical employees would respond.  Yet the assertion of 
unlikely deterrence is a distinctly empirical claim.  Stripped of empirical support, judicial 
claims about what actions are likely to deter a reasonable employee from complaining 
mask normative judgments about the level of adversity employees should tolerate in 
exchange for the privilege of asserting Title VII rights. 
 Narrow as this vision of a worthy claimant is, it is further narrowed by constraints 
on appropriate employee behavior at the opposite end of the spectrum.  While 
“unreasonably” thin-skinned employees are unprotected from “trivial” adverse actions 
under the Burlington Northern standard, employees who are too vigilant in pursuing their 
Title VII rights may undercut their own retaliation claims.  Through rights-claiming 
actions, a plaintiff may inadvertently demonstrate that the adverse action of the employer 
was not sufficient to deter further complaints.  Sykes v. Pa. State Police,210 for example, 
held that a retaliatory action is not materially adverse if the complainant continues to 
vigorously pursue and supplement the discrimination charges.211 The plaintiff, a black 
female police communications officer, received lower performance ratings in response to 
her internal and EEOC complaints of race discrimination.  Even if she proved causation, 
the court ruled, the retaliation was not materially adverse because, “whether characterized 
as major or minor, [it] did not deter [the plaintiff’s] pursuit of new and expanded 
allegations of discrimination, either internally or administratively.”212 This reasoning 
departs from Burlington Northern, which requires only that the action would likely deter 
a reasonable employee from complaining—not that it actually did—but if adopted more 
broadly, such reasoning could potentially unravel the retaliation claim entirely. 
 Not all of the post-Burlington Northern case law is so stringent; some courts have 
given employees more leeway to challenge retaliatory actions than earlier case law in the 
 
208 Id. (quoting Burlington Northern, 126 S. Ct. at 2415). 
209 Sykes v. Pa. State Police, No. Civ. A 05-1349, 2007 WL 141064, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 
2007). 
210 Id. at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2007). 
211 Id. at *6-7 (“[The plaintiff’s] vigorous and repeated use of all available means to supplement, 
expand, and pursue allegations of discrimination destroys the second element of her prima facie retaliation 
claim. . . . [The plaintiff’s] own aggressive response to what she identified as instances of discrimination 
belies any argument she might make that a reasonable person confronted with the ‘adverse employment 
actions’ that she describes would have been dissuaded from voicing additional allegations of 
discrimination.”). 
212 Id. at *6. 
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stricter circuits would have allowed.213 Nevertheless, as a whole, the post-Burlington 
Northern cases are surprisingly tough on retaliation claimants, given that the decision 
was widely heralded as a victory for employees soon after it was issued.214 
The underlying difficulty with the “likely to deter” standard is the mismatch 
between widely shared expectations about how employees respond to discrimination and 
their actual responses.  As explained above, common assumptions that people are strident 
and vigilant in responding to discrimination—assumptions reflected in Burlington 
Northern and the case law it has spawned—turn out to be false.  As a result, much 
employer retaliatory behavior that is likely to actually deter actual employees from 
complaining is left unregulated and fully lawful by recent interpretations of this standard. 
B. THE REASONABLE BELIEF DOCTRINE 
Retaliation law uses idealized images of discrimination claimants to limit actual 
employees’ protection from retaliation in other ways as well.  Title VII retaliation 
doctrine posits a complainant who has solid evidentiary support for believing that 
discrimination occurred and a near-perfect understanding and acceptance of the limits of 
current discrimination law.  Employees who do not meet this ideal take a grave risk in 
challenging perceived discrimination. 
 The source of these limits is the reasonable belief doctrine, an understanding of 
which requires some background on Title VII’s retaliation framework.  Title VII divides 
retaliation claims into two camps, depending on which of two statutory clauses apply:  
the participation clause or the opposition clause.  The participation clause covers 
employee participation in Title VII’s statutorily authorized enforcement mechanisms, 
such as filing a charge with the EEOC or a lawsuit in court.215 The opposition clause 
covers a broader range of protected activity where Title VII’s formal enforcement 
processes have not yet been invoked.216 
The reasonable belief doctrine originally developed as an extension of protection 
from retaliation in claims falling under the opposition clause.  While the participation 
clause broadly protects employees who participate “in any manner” in Title VII’s 
enforcement mechanisms, seemingly without regard to the merits of the charge, a strict 
and literal reading of the opposition clause might limit protected activity to challenging 
 
213 See, e.g., Kessler v. Westchester County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 461 F.3d 199, 209-10 (2d Cir. 
2006); Halfacre v. Home Depot, USA, Inc., 221 Fed. Appx. 424, 433 (6th Cir. 2007). 
214 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Gives Employees Broader Protection Against 
Retaliation in Workplace, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, late ed., at 22, col. 1; E.J. Graff, Striking Back:  The 
Supreme Court Recently Handed Workers a 9-0 Victory in a Pivotal Workplace Discrimination Case, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 2006, 3d ed., at D1; L.M. Sixel, Supreme Court:  Ruling Widens Ability to Sue; 
Decision Favors Workers, Defines Retaliation Broadly, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, June 23, 2006, star ed., 
Business, at 1. 
215 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006) (making it unlawful to discriminate against an employee “because 
. . . he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, 
or hearing under this subchapter”). 
216 Id. (making it unlawful to discriminate against an employee “because he has opposed any 
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”). 
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only those employment actions that are deemed actually unlawful.  However, courts 
recognized early on that employees must be given some leeway if they mistakenly 
believe that their employer violated Title VII in order to provide meaningful protection to 
persons who complain outside of Title VII’s formal channels.217 At the same time, courts 
also recognized the importance of providing protection from retaliation under the 
opposition clause in order to encourage employees to seek to resolve such disputes 
informally, before involving courts and the EEOC. 
 Courts thus developed the reasonable belief doctrine to extend protection to 
employees who informally challenge employer practices that turn out to be lawful, so 
long as they had a reasonable, good faith belief that the challenged conduct violated Title 
VII.  Early cases emphasized the predicament that would otherwise confront employees, 
given the difficulty of determining, short of final adjudication, whether any particular 
employer action actually violates Title VII. 
 This rationale for the reasonable belief doctrine is sound.  Discrimination is a 
complex legal and social phenomenon and potential challengers cannot be certain in 
advance that the court that ultimately hears their retaliation claim will agree with their 
assessment of unlawful discrimination.  Few potential challengers would be willing to 
take the risk if their employer could punish them for complaining unless they could win a 
court case proving unlawful discrimination.  As many commentators have pointed out, 
employment discrimination cases are notoriously difficult to win.218 Limiting protection 
from retaliation to only those employees able to win a discrimination case would 
eviscerate Title VII’s protection from retaliation. 
 Yet the reasonable belief doctrine has failed to honor its original purpose—to 
protect the employee whose belief in unlawful discrimination turns out to be mistaken.  A 
few overly stringent “reasonable belief” decisions appeared earlier, but the serious 
trouble began after the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Clark County School District v. 
Breeden.219 
In Breeden, the plaintiff alleged that her employer retaliated after she complained 
of an incident involving a sexually charged verbal exchange between her supervisor and a 
coworker.  The incident involved a meeting between the plaintiff, her supervisor and a 
male coworker in which they were reviewing a personnel file and came across a comment 
stating, “Making love to her is like making love to the Grand Canyon.”  One of the men 
read the comment out loud and stated, “I don’t even know what that means.”  The other 
man replied, “I’ll tell you later,” and both men chuckled.  The plaintiff later complained 
to a supervisor that the incident made her feel uncomfortable, and she was allegedly 
 
217 See, e.g., McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1139 (5th Cir. 1981); Parker 
v. Balt. & OH RR Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 
F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978). 
218 See Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 555 (2001). 
219 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 
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retaliated against in response.  Evaluating this claim under the opposition clause,220 the 
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the alleged retaliation was not covered by Title 
VII as a matter of law because “no reasonable person could have believed that the single 
incident recounted above violated Title VII’s standard.”221 
Although little-noticed at the time, Breeden established a significant and troubling 
limitation on employees’ protection from retaliation.  Although the Court was correct that 
the facts before it would not constitute actionable harassment, the reasonable belief 
requirement it adopted sets up a difficult dilemma for employees.  Although employees 
are widely encouraged to report all sexually offensive conduct through specified 
employer channels, and indeed must do so to protect their later right to sue for 
harassment, they are left vulnerable to retaliation if they report conduct that is not legally 
actionable.  Although the Breeden case itself might be dismissed as aberrational—bad 
facts making bad law—it has served as the catalyst for an increasingly strict approach to 
protection against retaliation.  The post-Breeden reasonable belief cases are a sorry lot, 
strictly evaluating the reasonableness of the employee’s belief both factually and legally. 
1. The Factual Basis for Complaining 
 Courts require retaliation plaintiffs to show sufficient factual evidence of 
underlying discrimination to enable a reasonable person to conclude that discrimination 
occurred, a standard that comes perilously close to the standard for surviving summary 
judgment on the underlying discrimination claim.  This requirement creates a dilemma 
for employees, who are pressured to promptly assert their rights, but unprotected by 
retaliation law if they challenge discrimination without first gathering facts to prove it. 
 A recent district court decision, Kennedy v. Guthrie Public Schools,222 highlights 
the tensions created by the Ledbetter ruling in particular.  The plaintiff in that case, the 
principal of an alternative high school for at-risk students, was the only African-
American administrator employed by the district.  Based on a voluntary salary study, the 
district gave raises to eleven of the district’s administrators, all of whom were white, but 
not to ten other administrators, including the plaintiff.  The plaintiff raised his suspicion 
of race discrimination and allegedly experienced retaliation as a result.223 
The court ruled that the plaintiff’s perception of pay discrimination was 
unreasonable, and that the school district had denied the plaintiff a raise because its salary 
study had classified him as an assistant principal due to the smaller size of his school.  
The court emphasized that no one had told the plaintiff that the denial of a raise was 
racially motivated and that the plaintiff could not point to any witnesses who could testify 
 
220 As noted later in this section, the case also involved a claim under the participation clause for 
retaliation that the plaintiff allegedly experienced after filing a charge based on this incident with the 
EEOC. 
221 Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270. 
222 2007 WL 895145 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2007). 
223 As often occurs in retaliation cases, this case involved complicated issues of causation, but the 
court’s reasonable belief ruling purports to stand apart from causation as an independent basis for throwing 
out the claim. 
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that race was the reason for the pay decision.224 The court also rejected the argument that 
the decision to classify him as an assistant principal, rather than a principal, was a pretext 
made “to obscure the fact that as a building principal he was making less than the survey 
average.”225 The court dismissed the retaliation claim with the same analysis it used to 
grant summary judgment to the employer on the pay discrimination claim itself.226 
Other court decisions have been similarly strict in applying the reasonable belief 
standard to the factual basis for the plaintiff’s belief.  In Bazemore v. Georgia Technology 
Authority,227 for example, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant on a 
retaliation claim because the plaintiff had insufficient facts of discrimination.  The 
African-American plaintiff had complained of discrimination to his employer because he 
was subjected to disciplinary action while a white female coworker who engaged in 
similar conduct was not.  The court explained, “the record is devoid of evidence that a 
similarly situated white woman was treated more favorably than Plaintiff,” and cited case 
law from that circuit requiring “‘that the quantity and quality of the comparator’s 
misconduct be nearly identical.”228 It was not enough to show, as plaintiff had, that a 
similarly situated white comparator engaged in similar behavior and that the plaintiff was 
punished while she was not.  The court instead required plaintiff “to show that he and 
[the white employee] are similarly situated ‘in all relevant respects,’ including [her] past 
performance and disciplinary history.”229 The court gave no indication how an employee 
is expected to acquire such information, short of discovery.  This case is part of a broader 
trend in which courts wrongly apply the same standard for judging the reasonableness of 
the employee’s belief in discrimination under the retaliation claim as they apply to the 
underlying discrimination claim itself.230 
Courts also impose constraints on the kinds of evidence that can support a 
reasonable belief that discrimination occurred.  The reasonableness of the plaintiff’s 
 
224 Id. at *3.  The court also noted that nine of the other administrators who were denied raises 
were white and that the plaintiff remained the fifth highest paid administrator in the district.  Id. at *2-3. 
225 Id. at *4-6. 
226 Id. at *6 (“As discussed above, [plaintiff] has failed to offer any evidence that [defendant] 
denied him a salary increase on the basis of his race.  That dearth of evidence calls into serious question the 
reasonableness of [plaintiff’s] belief that he was the subject of race discrimination.”). 
227 2007 WL 917280 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007). 
228 Id. at *4.  As an alternative ruling, the court also supported its grant of summary judgment on 
the ground that it was not reasonable to believe that the disciplinary action in question amounted to an 
adverse employment action as a matter of law.  This part of the ruling addresses the legal sufficiency of the 
plaintiff’s belief that discrimination occurred, and is in line with cases discussed and criticized in part 
I.B.2.b. below. 
229 Id. at *4. 
230 See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of Arlington, 184 F. Supp. 553 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (finding plaintiff had 
an insufficient factual belief of religious discrimination because she offered only “conclusory” statements 
about her supervisor’s intent); Zappan v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation, 152 Fed. Appx. 211, 2005 U.S. 
LEXIS 23202 (Oct. 26, 2005) (finding an insufficient factual belief of discrimination because of the 
absence of evidence, apart from the plaintiff’s subjective belief, that the disciplinary measures were taken 
for racial or retaliatory motives). 
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belief in discrimination is measured by what the plaintiff herself experienced and her 
personal knowledge at the time she complained, not by what she later learned or learned 
from others second hand.  For example, in Anduze v. Florida Atlantic University,231 the 
court found insufficient evidence to support an employee’s belief that discrimination 
occurred, discounting the affidavits of two African-American students at the college who 
alleged that the plaintiff’s supervisor also treated them differently based on their race.232 
Because a discriminatory motive is usually proven circumstantially, the students’ reports 
could well have been relevant to the plaintiff’s belief that her supervisor engaged in 
racially disparate treatment, even if such evidence would not be admissible in a trial on 
the underlying discrimination charge.  The court’s refusal to consider the evidence 
illustrates the predicament confronting employees who must immediately challenge 
possible discrimination, but are vulnerable to retaliation if they lack the facts to prove it. 
 These cases leave employees who object to employer practices without sufficient 
evidence to back up their concerns in jeopardy of retaliation without legal recourse.  
Because courts evaluate the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief on a retaliation claim 
under the same overly strict standard they use for deciding summary judgment on the 
discrimination claim itself,233 the difficulty plaintiffs encounter in surviving summary 
judgment on discrimination claims bleeds into retaliation claims through the reasonable 
belief standard. 
2. Reasonable Beliefs About the Scope of Title VII Law 
 Perhaps the most problematic turn in the reasonable belief cases after Breeden is 
the increasing stringency of courts in measuring the reasonableness of employee beliefs 
in discrimination as a matter of law.  In addition to a reasonable factual basis, an 
employee who opposes discrimination also must have a legally sound belief that Title VII 
was violated in order to secure the law’s protection from retaliation.  The reasonableness 
of the employee’s belief is measured by existing law, and courts charge employees with 
full knowledge of existing law—including circuit-specific precedents—even if an 
employee had a good faith belief that the law reached farther.234 
231 151 Fed. Appx. 875 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2005). 
232 Id. at 879 (“The record reveals no evidence that she had suffered any change in her 
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment at the time of her internal grievances that 
would constitute an adverse employment action.”); see also id. at 879; Clover, 176 F.3d at 1352 (“[F]or 
opposition clause purposes, the relevant conduct does not include conduct that actually occurred . . . but 
was unknown to the person claiming protection under the clause.”). 
233See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court:  Common Law 
Judging Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 301 (discussing 
courts’ “chaotic” and “arbitrary” approach to whether to award summary judgment to defendants in 
employment discrimination cases); Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment 
Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 592-603 (2001) (criticizing lower courts’ overuse of summary judgment in 
employment discrimination cases). 
234 See, e.g., Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d at 1312 (“[P]laintiffs may not stand on their 
ignorance of the substantive law to argue that their belief was reasonable.”); Clover v. Total System Servs., 
Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999) (in retaliation claim, measuring plaintiff’s underlying claims of 
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Recent cases testing the legal sufficiency of employee beliefs in discrimination 
unduly constrain the permissible interpretations of discrimination law in order to label 
plaintiffs’ more expansive views unreasonable.  Courts’ use of the “unreasonableness” 
label squelches constructive dialogue about the proper scope of nondiscrimination 
requirements and grossly oversimplifies complex legal and social questions about what 
“discrimination” the law does and should encompass.  The following discussion 
illustrates the problems this doctrine has created for employees.235 
Numerous court decisions over-simplify and even misstate the law to find the 
plaintiff’s understanding of Title VII to be unreasonable, notwithstanding specific actions 
by the employer to encourage that very belief.  In one case, for example, the plaintiff 
complained about conduct that qualified as sexual harassment, a sexual assault by 
coworkers, but lacked a legally sufficient basis for holding the employer liable for it, and 
therefore was left without recourse for the retaliation she allegedly experienced for 
complaining.236 The plaintiff was allegedly assaulted by two male police officers with 
whom she went out for drinks after a late shift.  She claimed she was placed on light duty 
and eventually terminated after she reported the assaults.  Even though the facts were in 
dispute both as to the assault and the retaliation, the court granted summary judgment 
because the plaintiff could not show that the coworkers’ sexual assault was endorsed or 
exacerbated by any conduct of the employer, a prerequisite for employer liability for 
coworker sexual harassment under Title VII.237 
The court’s reasoning in that case is particularly egregious because the Title VII 
standard for employer liability for coworker harassment requires notice to the employer, 
followed by a failure to take appropriate action.  Proof that the employer acquiesced in 
the coworkers’ assaults or responded indifferently to the plaintiff’s complaint, for 
example, by requiring her to continue to work with the two officers, could well have led 
to employer liability for the failure to correct a hostile environment.  The dilemma for 
employees under the court’s ruling is stark.  In a vicious chicken and egg cycle, the 
court’s ruling gives no protection from retaliation for complaining of coworker 
harassment without a prior basis for employer liability, but employer liability for 
coworker harassment is not possible without first complaining about the harassment and 
waiting for the employer’s response.  To require a legal predicate for employer liability 
 
sexual harassment against “existing substantive law” and whether conduct was “severe or pervasive enough 
that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive”); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care 
Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting plaintiff’s retaliation claim for lack of reasonable 
belief; plaintiff’s complaint of sexual orientation discrimination was not objectively reasonable because 
such discrimination is not prohibited under Title VII). 
235 The discussion herein focuses on cases decided since January of 2005.  For a discussion and 
critique of earlier reasonable belief cases, see Brake, supra note 125, at 28-32.  The reasonable belief case 
law has only gotten worse since that article was written. 
236 See Bicknell v. City of St  Petersburg, 2006 WL 560167 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2006). 
237 The court’s discussion of the liability question is cryptic, but it concludes that “a sexual assault 
by a coworker does not constitute an employment practice proscribed by Title VII.”  Id. at 6. 
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before complaining about coworker harassment utterly defeats Title VII’s substantive 
rights against sexual harassment.238 
Another unforgiving court left a plaintiff unprotected from retaliation for 
complaining about sexual favoritism in the workplace on the grounds that no reasonable 
employee could believe that a supervisor’s favoritism toward a paramour violated Title 
VII.239 The court charged the plaintiff with knowledge of Eleventh Circuit precedent on 
sexual favoritism claims,240 and deemed the plaintiff’s belief that sex discrimination had 
occurred unreasonable because the plaintiff could not show that a male manager would 
have been treated more favorably than she was.241 
The court’s discussion, however, grossly over-simplified the state of the law.  In 
actuality, the question of whether sexual favoritism in the workplace constitutes 
discrimination under Title VII is a complicated question.242 The court’s ruling in this 
case is particularly egregious because the plaintiff’s belief that sexual favoritism is a form 
of sexual harassment was encouraged and supported by the employer’s own policies, 
which prohibited supervisor-subordinate consensual relationships, in part, because of 
concerns about sexual harassment liability.243 While the plaintiff claimed that she relied 
on the company policy in formulating her belief that the favoritism was illegal 
harassment, the court measured the reasonableness of her belief against its own view of 
current law and disregarded the employer’s role in shaping the plaintiff’s belief.244 
Plaintiffs have also lost retaliation claims where they opposed harassment of 
persons other than employees, such as members of the public or clients.  These rulings 
also over-simplify complex questions about the proper scope of Title VII and its coverage 
 
238 Another possibility, albeit one that the court did not discuss or appear to consider, might be that 
the retaliation could itself create employer liability on a hostile environment claim for coworker harassment 
by establishing that the employer failed to act promptly and appropriately once on notice of the harassment.  
However, this would effectively require prevailing on the merits of the discrimination claim in order to 
secure any recovery for the retaliation, something retaliation doctrine purports not to require—and must not 
require, if Title VII’s protection from retaliation is to be anything more than empty rhetoric. 
239 See Sherk v. Adesa Atlanta, LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 31, 2006). 
240 Id. at 1370 (“The court measures the objective reasonableness of an employee’s belief against 
existing substantive law and, accordingly, charges the plaintiff with substantive knowledge of the law.”); 
id. (“[T]he unanimity with which the courts have declared favoritism of a paramour to be gender-neutral 
belies the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s belief that such favoritism created a hostile work environment.”). 
241 Id. at 1371 (stating that “when a supervisor gives favorable treatment to his paramour, every 
other employee with whom he is not having sex experiences the resultant discrimination or harassment, 
regardless of their gender”). 
242 See, e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 421, 423 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing legal uncertainty over the treatment of 
sexual favoritism); MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
499-501 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing the controversy over whether sexual favoritism is a form of sexual 
harassment).  
243 432 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. 
244 Id. at 1372 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that her belief was reasonable given that the 
employer’s handbook specifically linked sexual favoritism and sexual harassment “because Plaintiff is 
charged with knowledge of the substantive law”). 
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of hostile environment harassment.  For example, in Neely v. City of Broken Arrow,245 the 
court ruled that it was not reasonable, as a matter of law, to believe that Title VII bars 
firefighters from sexually harassing members of the public.  The plaintiff in that case, a 
deputy fire chief, had been notified that three firefighters allegedly engaged in a pattern 
of sexually harassing conduct while on duty attending a training program in another town 
and while driving a Fire Department vehicle to the training program.246 Even though city 
officials strongly encouraged the plaintiff to conduct an investigation into the allegations, 
“and informed plaintiff of their belief that a failure to do so might expose the city to 
liability under Title VII,” the court ruled that any resulting retaliation for the plaintiff’s 
investigation and discipline of the firefighters was not protected under Title VII because a 
reasonable employee would know that Title VII only protects employees from 
discrimination.247 
Once again, the limits of Title VII law are not so obvious or clear-cut as the court 
suggests.  One of the earliest hostile environment cases, Rogers v. EEOC,248 cited 
approvingly by the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,249 recognized that 
race discrimination against clients might contribute to a racially hostile work 
environment for employees.250 In addition to the Neely court’s overly simplistic view of 
Title VII law, its reasoning can also be faulted for measuring the reasonableness of the 
plaintiff’s belief exclusively against existing law, without regard to how the employer’s 
own actions shaped the employee’s beliefs.  Much like the court’s decision in Sherk,
described above, the court here made no allowance for how the employer’s statements 
influenced the plaintiff’s understanding of Title VII law by raising the concern about 
potential Title VII liability from the firefighters’ conduct.251 
Although many of the decisions rejecting the legal sufficiency of the employee’s 
belief involve applications of harassment law, the standard applies to other legal limits on 
discrimination as well.  For example, in Bazemore v. Georgia Technology Authority,252 
245 2007 WL 1574762, 100 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1549 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007). 
246 Id. at *1. 
247 Id. at *3 (“Harassment of members of the public, however vulgar and inappropriate, is not 
covered by Title VII. . . .  It follows that a retaliation claim based on opposition to or investigation of a co-
workers harassment if the public does not state a claim of action under Title VII.”).  The court did, 
however, allow leave for the plaintiff to amend his complaint in case he could allege facts that might 
connect the firefighter’s harassment to discrimination against city employees, such as “evidence that they 
recounted their exploits to fellow firefighters . . . in the presence of female [city] Fire Department 
employees.”  Id. at *4. 
248 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). 
249 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
250 Rogers, 454 F.2d at 239; see also Brake, supra note 125, at 18, 94-98 (discussing and 
criticizing other retaliation cases rejecting retaliation claims where the underlying conduct opposed 
involved harassment of non-employees such as clients or members of the public). 
251 Neely, 2007 WL 1574762 at *5 (“Mere statements that other persons told plaintiff that the 
underlying conduct could subject the Fire Department to Title VII liability is not sufficient.”). 
252 2007 WL 917280 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007). 
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the court ruled that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable belief that the challenged 
discrimination was unlawful because the alleged discrimination did not, as a matter of 
law, amount to an adverse employment action.  In that case, the plaintiff had complained 
of discrimination in the employer’s administration of a “performance improvement 
discussion,” an informal, critical evaluation.  The court ruled that because the criticism 
was not part of a formal disciplinary process and did not result in a demotion, pay cut or 
other tangible harm, it did not constitute an adverse employment practice at the time the 
plaintiff complained of it.253 The court’s cursory discussion of the requirements for an 
adverse employment action obscures the complexity of debate on this issue and the 
uncertainty surrounding the threshold required for an adverse employment action under 
Title VII.254 
Even in situations where the legal contours of discrimination law are clear and not 
over-simplified by courts, it is still questionable whether employees should be held to 
strict conformity with current law in opposing what they believe to be discriminatory.  
For example, in Dinicola v. Chertoff,255 an employee lost a retaliation claim where he had 
complained about an employer’s refusal to consider him for a position because of his age.  
Although the age discrimination in that case was undisputed, the plaintiff was only 37 
years old, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act limits the protected class to 
persons 40 years of age and older.  Accordingly, any retaliation against the plaintiff for 
complaining was lawful because he did not have a reasonable belief that the employer 
had violated the ADEA.256 Although this case is on stronger ground than those 
previously discussed because at least the legal limits were clear in this case and the 
employer did not appear to influence the plaintiff’s understanding of the law, it still 
places an unduly heavy burden on employees to thoroughly understand the limitations of 
discrimination law before voicing a complaint, however informally. 
 One of the more troubling developments since Breeden has been the plethora of 
court decisions finding employees’ beliefs that they were opposing unlawful harassment 
to be unreasonable because they complained of harassment too soon, before enough 
incidents had occurred to create a hostile environment.257 These cases address employee 
challenges to both racial harassment and sexual harassment, and introduce an additional 
complication for employees.  In addition to oversimplifying the limits of discrimination 
law and discounting the ways employers shape employee understandings of 
discrimination, these decisions create a distinct dilemma for employees who experience 
individual incidents of harassment.  In numerous recent decisions, plaintiffs have lost 
 
253 Id. at *1-2, 3. 
254 See Zimmer, supra note 233, at 104-06 (discussing the controversy over what counts as a 
materially adverse employment action under Title VII). 
255 2007 WL 1456224 (E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2007). 
256 Id. at *6 (“[T]hough it is clear that defendant engaged in the activity that plaintiff first 
complained of, denying him an employment interview based solely on his age, it is equally clear that this 
activity is not unlawful under the ADEA” because “plaintiff was not within the class of individuals 
protected by the act.”). 
257 In addition to the more recent cases discussed here, see also Brake, supra note 125, at 88 n.242. 
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retaliation cases on the ground that no reasonable employee could have believed that the 
challenged conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an actionable hostile 
environment.  Such rulings leave employees in the untenable position of having to 
promptly report acts of harassment through employer channels in order to preserve their 
right to later challenge the harassment under Title VII, yet risk lawful retaliation by 
employers if they complain too soon, before the offending conduct comes close enough 
to an actionable hostile environment.  These doctrines converge to leave an increasingly 
narrow space for employees to protect their rights to a nondiscriminatory work 
environment.  The following examples illustrate how this doctrine punishes employees 
who speak up too soon against workplace harassment. 
 One of the more notorious reasonable belief cases in recent years is the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corporation.258 The plaintiff in that 
case was allegedly terminated for opposing what he believed was racial harassment, and 
the court applied the reasonable belief doctrine to uphold summary judgment for the 
employer.  The conduct precipitating the plaintiff’s underlying complaint occurred when 
a coworker in a company office was watching television coverage of the capture of the 
DC snipers, two African American men, and exclaimed in front of the plaintiff, also an 
African American man, “They should put those two black monkeys in a cage with a 
bunch of black apes and the apes f---k them.”259 When plaintiff, who was upset by the 
comment, discussed the incident with two coworkers, they told him that this employee 
had made similarly offensive remarks many time before.260 
Over a strong dissent by Judge King, the majority held that no reasonable 
employee could believe that this isolated remark amounted to a racially hostile 
environment in violation of Title VII.  The majority cited circuit court precedent for the 
principle that an isolated racist remark does not amount to a hostile environment, and 
emphasized the sine quo non of actionable hostile environment as repeated and sustained 
conduct.261 Minimizing the severity of the remark, the majority characterized it as 
“rhetorical,” not directed at the plaintiff, and prompted by an emotional reaction to a 
major news event, “a far cry” from racist conditions so severe as to alter the terms and 
conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.262 To the allegation that the plaintiff’s 
coworkers told him that this same employee had repeatedly made similar remarks in the 
past, the court responded that plaintiff had not himself experienced such remarks in the 
four years he worked there.263 The majority’s ruling puts the onus on employees to show 
that “a plan was in motion” that would create an unlawful hostile environment, and that 
such a result was “likely to occur” before complaining about conduct which, if it 
persisted, would create such an environment.264 
258 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006). 
259 Id. at 336. 
260 Id. at 337. 
261 Id. at 339-40. 
262 Id. at 340, 341. 
263 Id. at 341. 
264 Id. at 340-41. 
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The court’s decision is particularly egregious because the employer’s 
nondiscrimination policy required employees to report any racial harassment to a 
supervisor, which the plaintiff did.265 The majority responded to the plaintiff’s arguments 
about the resulting double-bind facetiously, insisting that there is no double-bind if the 
harassment is close enough to an unlawful hostile environment to meet the reasonable 
belief test, and attributing whatever hardship resulted from its ruling to Congress’s 
judgment and not the court’s.266 
Like many of the reasonable belief decisions, the majority’s reasoning overstates 
the clarity of harassment law by citing conservative decisions that support its result, 
without engaging reasonable arguments for setting a different threshold for severity and 
pervasiveness.  Judge King’s dissent masterfully exposes the extreme and threatening 
racism in the offending comment and vividly describes the resulting Catch-22 for 
employees, who are required to report such conduct under employer policies, and must 
do so to preserve their Title VII rights to challenge such harassment, yet are left 
vulnerable to retaliation when they do.267 The harshness of the court’s decision contrasts 
sharply with the majority’s rhetoric promising generous protection from retaliation under 
Title VII.268 
The Jordan decision is one of several recent cases in which employees report 
racial harassment through employer-directed channels, allegedly experience retaliation in 
response, and are left with no legal recourse because the racially offensive conduct they 
reported was not severe or pervasive enough to support a reasonable belief that the 
company violated Title VII.269 The resulting predicament is devastating for Title VII’s 
effectiveness as a mechanism for addressing racial harassment. 
 
265 Id. at 347. 
266 Id. at 341-43. 
267 Id. at 350-51 (explaining how the comment “play[ed] on historic, bigoted stereotypes that have 
characterized [African Americans] as uncivilized, non-human creatures who are intellectually and 
culturally inferior to whites,” and why such a comment is “acutely insulting” and threatening to African 
Americans in a way “our panel is scarcely qualified to comprehend”); id. at 352-53 (“its decision has 
placed employees like Jordan in an untenable position, requiring them to report racially hostile conduct, but 
leaving them entirely at the employer’s mercy when they do so,” and citing Fourth Circuit precedent 
interpreting the affirmative defense to require employees to promptly report harassment rather than wait to 
investigate and gather evidence). 
268 Id. at 338-39 (characterizing the court’s reasonable belief precedent as “reading the language 
generously to give effect to its purpose,” rather than limiting protection to complaints of actually unlawful 
discrimination); id. at 343 (“Congress limited the scope of retaliation claims, and [Fourth Circuit precedent] 
amply, indeed generously, protects employees who reasonably err in understanding those limits.”). 
269 See Carlisle v. Sallie Mae, 2007 WL 141138 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2007) (plaintiff lacked a 
reasonable belief that four incidents involving racially derogatory comments, including supervisors’ 
reference to Martin Luther King day as “spook day,” was sufficiently servere or pervasive to violate Title 
VII); Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2007) (plaintiff lacked a 
reasonable belief that supervisor’s “racially inappropriate” reference to “ghetto children” was sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to violate Title VII); Wilson v. Dept. of Children and Families, 2006 WL 66723 at *8 
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s retaliation claim for lack of reasonable belief and stating, 
“[n]or is the allegation, which we must accept as true for summary judgment purposes, that Day made a 
single racially derogatory remark a basis for bringing a charge of discrimination”). 
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Cases applying the reasonable belief test to employees who challenge sexually 
harassing conduct create a similar dilemma.  In Lowry v. Regis Salons Corp.,270 for 
example, the plaintiff claimed that she experienced retaliation for complaining to her 
employer of sexually offensive behavior by a coworker.  In the incident in question, a 
coworker asked the plaintiff to go with him to a backroom for the ostensible purpose of 
showing her a rash on his leg.  When she did, instead of lifting his pant leg as she had 
expected, he unfastened his pants and dropped them to floor, revealing red bikini 
underwear that left part of his genitals exposed, and he “had his hands on his hips and 
was moving them toward his waistline and genital area.”271 The plaintiff quickly left the 
area.272 Plaintiff complained to a store manager about the incident, and in her retaliation 
claim, alleged that she was fired as a result. 
 The court granted summary judgment to the employer, ruling that the plaintiff 
could not have reasonably believed that the one incident in question created an unlawful 
hostile environment.273 Measuring the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief under the 
existing law of the circuit, the court ruled that the underlying incident was not severe or 
pervasive enough to support a reasonable belief that it was unlawful because it did not 
make the plaintiff feel “intimidated, threatened, or humiliated,” but only uncomfortable, 
and it did not affect her job performance.274 The court summed up the gap between the 
plaintiff’s understanding and existing law as follows:  “[A]s a matter of law in this 
Circuit, a single incident of stripping down to one’s underwear in front of an employee, 
for the purpose of showing a rash on the leg, absent a showing of additional gender 
related harassment, does not constitute sexual harassment when judged by existing 
substantive law.”275 
Like many of the reasonable belief decisions, the court’s ruling made no 
allowance for how employer policies and pronouncements shape the reasonableness of an 
employee’s belief about how she should respond to sexually offensive behavior.  When 
the plaintiff was hired, she was required to sign an acknowledgement form stating that 
she had received, read and understood the employer’s sexual harassment policy, and “that 
she understood her obligation as an employee to promptly report to the appropriate 
persons activities and/or conduct which may constitute harassment.”276 The court’s 
 
270 2006 WL 2583224 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2006). 
271 Id. at *4. 
272 Id. Soon after this incident, the same coworker remarked to the plaintiff, in front of a client, 
that “she had seen him in the buff.”  Id. 
273 Id. at *11.  The court also faulted the plaintiff for inadequate proof of causation, an independent 
requirement for succeeding on a retaliation claim. 
274 Id. at *11; see also id. (“Under the law of this Circuit, the conduct of which Plaintiff 
complained was not severe or pervasive enough to have interfered with her job performance, so that it 
could constitute, or reasonably be believed to constitute, unlawful behavior under Title VII.”). 
275 Id. at *12. 
276 Id. at *4.  The court also faulted the plaintiff for insufficient proof of causation and for failing 
to report the conduct to the proper persons, notwithstanding plaintiff’s efforts in leaving numerous 
unreturned phone messages.  Id. at *4-5, 12-13. 
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decision leaves employees with little margin for error if they follow employer 
instructions to report behavior they understand to be harassment, but cannot later 
convince a court, in the event of employer retaliation, that this belief was reasonable as 
measured by existing law.  Like the cases involving challenges to racial harassment, 
Breeden has prompted a trend of lower court decisions deeming employees unreasonable 
for challenging perceived sexual harassment without a sufficient quantity of conduct to 
amount to unlawful harassment.277 
Taken as a whole, the most recent cases applying the reasonable belief 
requirement paint a picture that contrasts starkly with judicial rhetoric about the 
generosity of the reasonable belief standard as an alternative to requiring the challenged 
conduct to actually violate Title VII.278 Although courts continue to tout the liberality of 
the reasonable belief doctrine for going beyond opposition to conduct that is actually 
illegal, in fact, instances of judicial generosity in applying the reasonable belief standard 
are few and far between.279 An employee who challenges perceived discrimination 
without sufficient factual or legal support to withstand summary judgment on a legal 
challenge to the underlying discrimination may have no legal recourse for the retaliation 
that follows. 
 As these cases show, many courts effectively equate a reasonable belief in 
unlawful discrimination with the actuality of unlawful discrimination.  Particularly when 
it comes to mistaken legal understandings, there is very little room for employee error.  
As one district court forthrightly described the reasonable belief standard and its 
relationship to actual unlawful discrimination: 
The critical inquiry is whether plaintiff has a reasonable, good faith belief 
that he opposes conduct that is unlawful under Title VII.  However, 
whether it is reasonable for a plaintiff to believe that the conduct is 
 
277 See, e.g., Amos v. Tyson Foods, Inc.153 Fed. Appx. 637 (11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2005) (finding it 
unreasonable for plaintiffs to have believed that single incident of a male employee entering women’s 
dressing room and stopping to “gawk” and “taunt [one of them] with hand gestures” while they were 
dressing violated Title VII); Tatt v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 138 Fed. Appx. 145, 2005 WL 1114356 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (not reasonable for plaintiff to have believed that supervisor’s once-a-week conduct of 
pretending to unzip his pants and urinate all over the paperwork she brought him and daily obnoxious, 
although not necessarily sexual, taunts violated Title VII); Greene v. A Duie Pyle, Inc., 170 Fed. Appx. 
853, 2006 WL 694377 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 2006); (plaintiff, a male and self-identified Christian employee, 
could not reasonably have believed that sexually explicit jokes and pornography in the workplace was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to violate Title VII’s ban on a sexually hostile environment). 
278 See, e.g., Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 345 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that 
employees “are not required to collect enough evidence of discrimination to put the case before a jury 
before they blow the whistle”); Geer v. Marco Warehousing, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 
2001) (“The action opposed need not have actually been sexual harassment, however. It would be 
impertinent of the court to require lay persons to possess an intimate understanding of the law, particularly 
in an area as nuanced as this one.”). 
279 See, e.g., Garcia v. Lewis, 2005 WL 1423253 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2005); Burroughs v. Smurfit 
Stone Container Corp., LP, 2007 WL 778479 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2007). 
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art67
55
unlawful under Title VII depends on whether, as a general matter, the 
underlying conduct is unlawful under Title VII.280 
The circularity here is notable.  If the conduct opposed turns out not to violate Title VII, 
employees take a considerable risk in reporting or challenging it. 
3. The Expansion of the Reasonable Belief Doctrine:  The Shrinking 
Protection of the Participation Clause and the Increasing 
Privatization of Discrimination Complaints 
 It is tempting to think, based on the earlier discussion locating the origins of the 
reasonable belief standard in the language of the opposition clause, that the problems 
created by the above body of case law might be avoided by filing a discrimination 
complaint directly with the EEOC and bypassing employer channels for complaining, 
thereby triggering the broader protection of the participation clause and steering clear of 
the reasonable belief doctrine in an action for subsequent retaliation.  There are two 
problems with this as a strategy for escaping the reasonable belief predicament.  First, it 
is no longer so clear that the reasonable belief requirement applies only to retaliation 
claims that fall under the opposition clause.  Recent case law suggests that the reasonable 
belief test developed under the opposition clause is beginning to bleed into participation 
clause claims as well.281 
Second, and most important, in the current environment of employer privatization 
of discrimination claims and the increasing pressure to channel discrimination complaints 
into employer grievance processes, it is utterly unrealistic to expect employees to bypass 
such procedures, remain silent about their concerns, and go straight to the EEOC.  
 
280 Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, OK, 2007 WL 1574762 at *3, 100 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1549 (N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007).  See also Bazemore v. Georgia Technology Authority, 2007 WL 
917280 at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007) (“To determine whether Plaintiff’s belief was objectively 
reasonable, the Court must analyze, under substantive law, whether Defendants actually engaged in an 
unlawful employment practice by disciplining him more severely than [a similarly situated white 
female].”). 
281 See Mattson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 359 F.3d 885, 891-92 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that both the 
participation clause and the opposition clause require “the same threshold standard” of reasonableness); 
Neely v. City of Broken Arrow, Oklamha, 2007 WL 1574762, 100 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1549 
(N.D. Okla. May 29, 2007) (construing Tenth Circuit precedent to require the application of Breeden’s 
reasonable belief requirement to retaliation claims brought under the participation clause); see also Moore 
v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing applicable standard as requiring an 
objectively reasonable belief without distinguishing between the opposition and participation clauses); 
Bazemore v. Georgia Technology Authority, 2007 WL 917280 at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2007) (same); 
Crumpacker v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 338 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Eleventh 
Amendment challenge to retaliation claims based on the court’s view that such claims require an 
objectively reasonable belief in underlying discrimination); Soto v. Bank of America, NA, 2005 WL 
2861116 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2005) (stating that the Eleventh Circuit has not decided whether an objective 
reasonable belief requirement applies to participation clause claims).  The application of the reasonable 
belief test to participation clause claims rests on a misreading of Breeden, since the participation clause 
claim in that cases was disposed of on the alternate ground of causation, but could have easily been swept 
into the reasonable belief analysis had that standard applied.  See Breeden, 523 U.S. at 271-73. 
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Indeed, the increasing privatization of employment discrimination disputes has made the 
reasonable belief doctrine all the more problematic.  
 As discussed previously, employers increasingly instruct employees to report 
perceived discrimination and harassment internally through employer specified 
procedures.282 Training of employees on sexual harassment and discrimination policies 
and the channels for reporting has become a cottage industry.283 This trend has 
effectively expanded the scope of the increasingly strict reasonable belief test in the post-
Breeden environment.  Because participation in such procedures falls under the 
opposition clause rather than the participation clause, the trend toward privatization has 
effectively expanded the scope of the reasonable belief test.  By doing so, the channeling 
of discrimination complaints into employers’ internal dispute resolution processes has 
come at a high cost that has not been generally acknowledged.  To the extent that 
protection from retaliation is greater under the participation clause than the opposition 
clause, which remains the general rule,284 the privatization of discrimination complaints 
leaves employees with less protection from retaliation than if they had initiated formal 
charges under the statute in lieu of pursuing internal procedures. 
 Despite the increasing linkage between employer procedures for addressing 
discrimination and Title VII’s liability framework, courts have stubbornly held that 
employee participation in an employer’s internal grievance process is governed only by 
the opposition clause and not by the more generous participation clause.285 In order to 
trigger the participation clause, courts require a prior filing with the EEOC as a bright-
line rule.286 Even if an EEOC charge is eventually filed, employee participation in an 
 
282 See supra text accompanying notes 77-84. 
283 See Grossman, Culture of Compliance, supra note 53, at 77-85 (describing HR culture’s role in 
the proliferation of anti-harassment policies, procedures, and training). 
284 See, e.g., Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999); Pettway v. 
American Cast Iron Pipe Co.  411 F.2d 998, 1004-07 (5th Cir. 1969); Booker v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th Cir. 1989); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 
1980); Breeden v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 232 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2000);  E.E.O.C. v. Total System 
Services, Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2000). 
285 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Total System Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(“[A]t a minimum, some employee must file a charge with the EEOC (or its designated representative) or 
otherwise instigate proceedings under the statute for the conduct to come under the participation clause.”).  
Our research uncovered only one court decision that treats participation in an employer’s internal 
investigation of discrimination, absent filing of an EEOC charge, as protected activity under the 
participation clause.  See Maclean v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (M.D. Fla. 2002).  This 
decision relied on a dissenting opinion from the Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to reconsider its ruling in EEOC 
Total System Services, which the district court in Maclean mistakenly referred to as the decision of the 
Eleventh Circuit.  Although this court recognized the grave risks to employees if such conduct were placed 
outside of the participation clause, it is, unfortunately, an anomalous decision and appears to rest on a 
misreading of circuit court precedent. 
286 There is, however, an exception to this bright line rule where the employer knows that an 
employee is about to file an EEOC charge and acts preemptively to retaliate.  See, e.g., Geer v. Marco 
Warehousing, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (acknowledging that the participation 
clause may extend to “the expression of an intent to file a charge” because “employees should not be 
bullied out of filing E.E.O.C. charges”).  However, this exception is limited by the specificity courts require 
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employer’s internal proceedings before the charge was filed falls under the opposition 
clause and not the participation clause.  Consequently, any communications about alleged 
discrimination that occur before an EEOC charge has been filed are not protected from 
retaliation unless they pass the reasonable belief test under the opposition clause.287 
The courts’ insistence on a prior EEOC filing as a prerequisite for establishing 
“participation” in Title VII’s enforcement mechanisms rests on an increasingly obsolete 
distinction between Title VII’s statutorily specified enforcement provisions and 
voluntary, proactive measures to address discrimination.  As discussed above, recent 
developments in Title VII case law, including the Faragher/Ellerth and Kolstad cases, 
place strong legal incentives on employers to internally address discrimination in order to 
minimize their potential Title VII liability.  Treating employee participation in employer 
IDR processes for addressing discrimination as separate from official Title VII 
enforcement mechanisms makes little sense in the current environment, where such 
processes have been specifically developed for the very purpose of ensuring Title VII 
compliance.  Thus, the courts’ distinction between the enforcement processes specified in 
the statute and employers’ voluntary dispute resolution processes has become 
increasingly artificial.  The failure of courts to recognize the fallacy of this distinction 
leaves employees with less protection from retaliation than if employer IDR processes 
did not exist.  That is an odd result for a statute that purports to encourage employers to 
take voluntary compliance measures as a way of expanding the protections from 
discrimination for the benefit of employees.288 
* * *
in showing that the employee made a specific, imminent threat, rather than mere vague statements and 
speculative intentions.  See, e.g., Brower v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff’s 
conversation with an internal EEO officer inquiring about her EEO options and the plaintiff’s conversation 
with the employer’s human relations office the next day in which she vaguely threatened legal action did 
not trigger protection under the participation clause); Geer v. Marco Warehousing, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 
1332, 1336, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (plaintiff’s actions in seeking the advice of an attorney and sending a 
certified letter specifically stating that she was the victim of sexual harassment, and putting her employer 
on notice that “attorneys might involve themselves in the matter,” did not amount to a threat to file a formal 
EEOC charge as required to trigger the participation clause). 
287 See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Total System Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that protected activity under the participation clause “does not include participating in an employer’s 
internal, in-house investigation, conducted apart from a formal charge with the EEOC”); Booker v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that, “the instigation of 
proceedings leading to the filing of a complaint or a charge . . . is a prerequisite to protection under the 
participation clause,” and “any activity by the employee prior to the instigation of statutory proceedings is 
to be considered pursuant to the opposition clause”); Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., Inc., 348 F.3d 537, 543 
(6th Cir. 2003) (stating, with respect to participation clause coverage, “Title VII protects an employee’s 
participation in an employer’s internal allegations of unlawful discrimination where that investigation 
occurs pursuant to a pending EEOC charge”). 
288 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1974) (describing Title VII’s 
“prophylactic” purpose of encouraging voluntary self-compliance for the sake of protecting workers from 
discrimination). 
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Recent trends in retaliation law provide increasingly diluted protection from 
retaliation for engaging in rights-claiming behavior.  These trends contrast starkly with 
courts’ repeated exhortations about the generosity of Title VII protections.  While the 
reality of protection falls far short, the rhetoric of generosity feeds into and reinforces the 
strictness of the timely complaint doctrines.  The generous rhetoric allows courts to insist 
that fear of retaliation provides no excuse for not reporting or complaining of 
discrimination without delay, while the employees who do complain take great risks if 
they find themselves in need of the promised protection. 
CONCLUSION 
Negative reaction to the Supreme Court’s recent Ledbetter decision was swift and 
fervent.289 Critics chastised the Court for tightly restricting the time for filing pay 
discrimination claims without sufficient attention to the difficulties people face in 
discerning whether they are paid fairly.  The introduction of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2007 and its recent passage in the U.S. House of Representatives suggest that the time 
may be ripe for evaluating the fairness of Title VII’s rights-claiming system more 
broadly.290 
Ledbetter is an important and unfortunate decision for employees who experience 
pay discrimination, but its impact is better understood as a “piling on” rather than an 
anomalous roadblock for employees in need of the law’s protections.  Increasingly 
demanding doctrines at each end of the rights-claiming process fail employees, closing 
off Title VII’s substantive protections to all but the most vigilant and assertive workers, 
and leaving even those employees who do assert their rights in time at great risk of 
retaliation.  These doctrines work synergistically to reinforce the widespread and endemic 
reluctance to perceive and claim discrimination that is documented by social science 
literature.   
 The past decade’s surge of employer policies and procedures for resolving 
discrimination complaints internally plays an important role in contributing to the 
problems we identify.  The channeling of discrimination complaints into internal 
employer processes intersects with both ends of the doctrine, the timely filing rules and 
the retaliation protections.  By failing to toll the limitations period on formal remedies, 
participation in internal grievance processes can run out the clock on an unsuspecting 
employee’s formal assertion of rights.  In addition, because employer nondiscrimination 
policies shape employees’ beliefs about the scope of discrimination law, and because 
 
289 For a taste of some of the many editorial pieces criticizing the Court’s decision, see Supreme 
Letdown; The High Court Finds a Way to Accept Discrimination, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 6, 
2007, p.B-6; Supreme Injustice on Worker Equality, THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 5, 2007, p.11A; A Matter 
of Justice: Congress Should Correct ruling on fair pay, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 5, 2007, 
p.14A; An Absurd Bias Ruling, HARTFORD COURANT, June 5, 2007, at A10; Sterile thinking on pay equity,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 4, 2007, p.18; Narrow and Insidious, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 4, 2007; 
Life vs. The Law, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 31, 2007, p.26; Injustice 5, Justice 4, THE NEW YORK TIMES,
May 31, 2007, p.18. 
 
290 See supra note 1. 
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participation in such processes falls under Title VII’s opposition clause instead of its 
more generous participation clause, employees who participate in such processes may 
find themselves without protection from retaliation if their perception of unlawful 
discrimination turns out to be false.  Supporters of an expanded role for such internal 
processes have failed to consider the full costs of such measures, at least under existing 
doctrine.  In the current Title VII rights-claiming framework, such measures risk 
supplanting, not merely supplementing, Title VII’s formal mechanisms for protecting 
substantive rights. 
 As a whole, our analysis suggests much deeper problems than those created by the 
Court’s Ledbetter decision alone.  Salvaging meaningful access to Title VII’s substantive 
protections requires a much broader look at the flaws of Title VII as a rights-claiming 
system. 
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